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1. INTRODUCTION
A recent World Trade Organization (WTO) case held the United
States export tax subsidies to be inconsistent with U.S. WTO
obligations. Despite strong political resistance,2 which fed a long and
costly legislative process,3 the United States recently repealed these
I Appellate Body Report, United States - Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales
Corporations" - Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the European Communities,
WT/DS108/AB/RW (Jan. 14, 2002), available at www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/
dispue/108abrw.e.doc [hereinafter AB Report]. This decision ended the three-
decade dispute in the W'TO (formerly the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
or GATT) over the U.S. tax export subsidy regimes. It affirmed the decision of the
panel in the original ETI dispute, Panel Report, United States - Tax Treatment for
"Foreign Sales Corporations" - Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the European
Communities, WT/DS108/RW (Aug. 20, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop-e/dispu-e/108_art2l5_e.pdf, which itself was just the last link in a series
of related decisions. For a short summary of the dispute, see David L. Brumbaugh, A
History of the Extraterritorial Income (ETI) and Foreign Sales Corporation (FSC)
Export Tax-Benefit Controversy, WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY (Nov. 9, 2004) (LEXIS,
FEDTAX lib., TNI file, elec. cit., 2003 WTD 233-11); see also infra Part IV.B.
2 See, e.g., Edmund L. Andrews, Corporate Plea for Tax Breaks: Ours Come
First, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2003, at Al; Ernest Christian & Gary Hufbauer, Comment.
End This Damaging Tax and Trade Charade, FIN. TIMES USA, Mar. 9, 2004; Chuck
Gnaedinger, EU, Business Groups Size Up Thomas's Corporate Tax Plan (July 16,
2002) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNI file, elec. cit., 2002 WTD 136-2); Sander M. Levin,
EU Trying to "Bully" U.S. on ETI Repeal Issue (Nov. 7, 2003) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib.,
TNI file, elec. cit., 2003 WTD 216-27).
3 It took almost three years from the final decision to the repeal, which still
provides for the grandfathering of some of the prohibited subsidies and a two-year
transition relief, both of which are contested by the EU as illegal and expected to be
reversed. See Appellate Body Report, United States - Tax Treatment for "Foreign
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subsidies.4 This case and the U.S. reaction revealed that while the
United States is the single economic superpower, it is not as dominant
a player as some portray it.5 The case also shed light on the tension
between the present international trade and tax regimes and the
difficulty of applying WTO law to income tax measures. This tension
did not escalate earlier mainly because countries tended not to use
their income tax systems for protectionism. This article suggests that
the use of tax systems to protect domestic interests may increase as a
consequence of economic globalization. The proliferation of global
trade and the increasing power of free trade arrangements leave
income taxes as one of the few remaining measures that can
potentially serve protectionist purposes.
Sales Corporations" - Second Recourse by the European Communities to Article 21.5
of the DSU: Request for Consultations, WT/DS108/27 at 1 (Nov. 10, 2004), available at
http://docsonline.wto.org. The cost of the process became visible with the WTO's
permission for the EU to impose significant trade sanctions on U.S. exports as of
March 1, 2004. See Alison Bennett et al., WTO Gives EU Green Light for $4 Billion
in Sanctions Against United States over FSCs, BNA DAILY TAX REP., Sept. 3, 2002, at
GG-1; Transatlantic Tiff: The Spat Between America and Europe Heats Up,
ECONOMIST, Mar. 4, 2004, at 38. The sanctions played a significant role in support of
the legislation. See Grassley Stresses Importance of ETI Repeal Bill, TAx NOTES
TODAY (Oct. 13, 2004) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2004 TNT 198-33).
4 See American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 101, 118 Stat
1418, 1423-24.
5 For an interesting discussion of this point, see Paul B. Stephan, Sheriff or
Prisoner? The United States and the World Trade Organization, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 49
(2000).
6 It is reasonable to expect that protectionism through the income tax regime
will be undesirable from a domestic tax policy perspective. In general, the income tax
is designed to tax primarily residents and foreigners with substantial business
connections to the taxing jurisdiction. It is imposed on persons and it is difficult to
distinguish between persons who export (or import) without specific reference to
their underlying export or import activity. This difficulty mandates that protectionist
rules be transparent, and therefore both difficult to disguise from foreign scrutiny and
easy to exploit by taxpayers. Additionally, granting certain income tax benefits to
exporters, for example, will adversely affect the desirable qualities of the income tax,
such as efficiency and equity: there will be an inefficient tax incentive to export and
taxpayers with equal incomes may pay unequal income tax amounts. Obviously, the
progressivity of the income tax will also be skewed. Without getting into the
desirability or a cost-benefit analysis of any of the above, it is easy to see the
reluctance of policymakers to use the income tax for protectionism. See Michael
Lennard, Navigating by the Stars: Interpreting the WTO Agreements, 5 J. INT'L ECON.
L. 17 (2002) (developing a general discussion of estoppel issues in WTO
jurisprudence. On other occasions, Lennard has applied this discussion to the income
tax, asserting that countries may be estopped from using it for protectionism as part of
their general WTO obligations.).
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If this claim is true, then the current disconnect between the
international trade and tax regimes will cause both regimes to be
challenged, as they may both apply in some cases with different and
conflicting results. This article maps the tension and the possible
clashes between the international tax and trade regimes based on the
existing legal constructs. It further elaborates on the aforementioned
possible challenges to these regimes and attempts to contribute to a
workable solution, which may lead to the relief of this tension.
The solution advanced is based on the observation that although
the international trade and tax regimes cannot be simply reconciled or
meshed together, their policies could (and should) be coordinated,
with some adjustments made to the present legal constructs. This
article suggests that such coordination would benefit from the
establishment of an international tax organization, separate from the
WTO, with responsibility for making the evolving international tax
regime more compatible with the international trade regime. Further,
the article analyzes and rejects other solution models, primarily the
one I call the tax expenditure solution, which is based on the
contention that the international tax and trade regimes do not conflict,
and which is willing to subject some aspects of income taxes to WTO
scrutiny without any adjustments.
The above developments do not occur in a vacuum: free trade
theory is continuously under attack today, almost two centuries after
David Ricardo introduced the concept of comparative advantage.8
Despite serious misconceptions about the theory9 and public
pessimism about the gains from trade, its primary promoter, the
WTO, has survived and continues to evolve with a new round of
negotiations, known as the Doha Round. This success has been
shadowed lately by a vocal anti-globalization movement that picked
• 10
the WTO as its main target on several occasions, and even more
7 The tax expenditure solution model is constructed here from a Tillinghast
lecture by Professor Paul McDaniel on a closely related subject. See Paul R.
McDaniel, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture, Trade Agreements and Income Taxation:
Interactions, Conflicts, and Resolutions, 57 TAX L. REV. 275 (2004).
8 DAVID RICARDO, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION
(InteLex Corp. 1993) (1817).
9 For a classic discussion of the theory of comparative advantage and common
misconceptions, see PAUL R. KRUGMAN & MAURICE OBSTFELD, INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMICS (6th ed. 2003).
10 See JAGDISH BHAGWATI, IN DEFENSE OF GLOBALIZATION 15, 81-83, 86-87,
137, 246-47 (2004) (providing several examples of misdirected attacks of globalization
opponents on the WTO as a symbol of the phenomenon). For an example of a
specific campaign, see GLOBAL EXCHANGE, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, at
[Vol. 25:251
2005] International Trade and Tax Agreements
seriously, by the stall in the Doha Round negotiations, which was
caused by a crisis in trust between some major developing countries
(led by Brazil) and the developed world." The recent agreement over
agricultural subsidies 12 and the revival of the Doha Round
negotiations may help resolve this crisis. 3  In the meantime,
globalization14 continues to thrive, markets (and economies) continue
to open, and cross-border trade continues to grow. This is
undoubtedly the result of the WTO framework, which focuses on the
elimination of barriers to international trade.
Despite these developments, international tax policy has never
been addressed at a supranational level, in the WTO or elsewhere.
This is puzzling since the international trade and tax regimes are
intimately related on many levels." Also, taxation, and in particular
direct (or income) taxation, is, by definition, a barrier to international
trade. On the other hand, the elimination of income taxes is unlikely
in the near future, as most governments finance their operations to a
large extent with income tax revenues. 16 Insofar as the ideal of free
trade cannot be achieved, a compromise that both promotes free trade
http://www.globalexchange.org/campaigns/wto/ (last visited July 9, 2005).
1 The WTO Under Fire: The Doha Round, ECONOMIST, Sept. 18, 2003. The
crisis led to the establishment of the so-called G20 (formerly G21), led by Brazil, as a
coordinated pressure group for developing world interests in agriculture. For a short
summary of the history and goals of the G20, see G20 HISTORY, at http://www.g-
20.mre.gov.br/history.asp (last visited July 9, 2005).
12 The agreement, known as the "July Package," provided a framework for the
continuance of the talks. See General Council Decision, Doha Work Programme:
Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004, WT/L/579 (Aug. 2, 2004),
available a http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dda-e/ddadraft_31jul04_e.pdf; see
also Gary G. Yerkey, Farm Deal Clears Way for Broader Pact Setting Framework for
Future WTO Talks, BNA INT'L TRADE REP., Aug. 5, 2004, at 1304; Now Harvest It,
ECONOMIST, Aug. 5, 2004, at 34.
13 For example, the WTO director-general has recently expressed optimism
regarding the revival of the Doha Round. See Supachai Panitchpakdi, Beyond the
Crossroads: Moving Forward on the Doha Development Agenda, Address to the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (Oct. 4, 2004) (transcript available
at http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/spsp-e/spsp3l-e.htm); see also Daniel Pruzin,
Supachai Cites Positive Spirit in Doha Talks, Urges Early Planning for Hong Kong
Meeting, BNA INT'L TRADE REP., Dec. 16, 2004, at 2021-22.
14 This paper uses the term "globalization" in the sense of economic
globalization, as has become common in the economic literature. For an elaborate
discussion of the term and its possible meanings, see BHAGWATI, supra note 10.
15 See discussion in Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Income Tax Discrimination Against
International Commerce, 54 TAX L. REV. 131, 147-49 (2001).
16 Indirect taxes are growing in importance. See ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION
& DEV., REVENUE STATISTICS 1965-2003, at 21 tbl.C (2004).
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and allows for the existence of tax-related trade barriers must be
established.
As already mentioned, the current international trade regime
largely ignores the effects of income taxation. The international tax
arrangements that construct the international tax regime 17 are
generally carved out of the WTO's jurisdiction over international
trade"' (i.e., the supranational dimension of WTO law does not affect
the operation of the international tax regime). Up to now, this
arrangement has not caused any serious problems, but this is likely to
change as the conflict between the international trade and tax regimes
becomes more pronounced.
In early 2002, the United States lost a three-decade legal war over
its export tax subsidies." The most recent of these subsidies, known
as the Extraterritorial Income Exclusion (ETI), was not repealed by
Congress until January 1, 2005, despite significant sanctions
threatened for two years and finally imposed by the European Union
(EU) on March 1, 2004.20 This was the first important controversy
related to income tax measures that went through the dispute
settlement proceedings of the WTO. As suggested above, the use of
income tax systems for protectionism is not and has never been
common, mainly because of the potential negative impact it may have
on domestic tax policy. The primary exception has been the use of
export tax subsidies, which are now prohibited by WTO law. One
might argue that because this is the only significant exception and it
has been explicitly dealt with, it does not form a valid basis for
questioning the effectiveness of the current legal framework, including
the disconnect between the international tax and trade regimes.
Such an argument may be too simplistic for three reasons. First,
in the tax export subsidy cases, the United States raised several
arguments supporting the validity of its tax export subsidy regime.
The WTO dispute settlement body could not refute these arguments
and either disposed of them with unsatisfactory reasoning or simply
17 As originally termed by Professor Avi-Yonah. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah,
Commentary, 53 TAX L. REV. 167, 169 (2000) (arguing that the network of bilateral
tax treaties "constitutes an international tax regime, which has definable principles
that underlie it and are common to the treaties.")
18 See Warren, supra note 15, at 141-46. This carve-out was not supported by
any in-depth analysis or other normative discussion; it was an ad-hoc political
compromise. See infra note 23.
19 See AB Report, supra note 1.
20 See American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 101, 118 Stat
1418, 1422-1423.
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21ignored them. Such a cursory disposition was problematic not only
because of the nonrigorous analysis itself, but also because the tax
export subsidies regime should have been easily disposed of by the
WTO's Appellate Board (AB) as an "easy case" - a clear and blunt
violation of the fundamental principles embedded in the WTO
agreements. The WTO efforts in this regard raise questions about the
22
sufficiency of the current legal basis of the WTO in such cases.
Second, the export subsidy case was special because the disputed
regime evolved from an earlier compromise between the United
States and the EU, which compromise supposedly immunized U.S.
export tax subsidies from a European challenge in exchange for the
U.S. promise not to challenge the European territorial tax systems
and maybe even the zero-percent value-added tax (VAT) on
exports.23 If indeed the compromise reflected the status quo, which
was disrupted by the EU's successful challenge of Foreign Sales
Corporations (FSCs) (which in turn may have been triggered by the24
EU losses in other cases ), then United States retaliation is possible, if
not expected, until a new equilibrium is established. An effective way
to reach that equilibrium could be to amend the current legal
constructs to reflect more clearly the parties' present understanding
on this matter.
Finally, and most importantly, countries that wish to engage in
protectionism, either for efficiency or political reasons, may find it
increasingly difficult to do so as the supranational WTO legal
construct evolves. 25  Conversely, the potential gains from
21 See, e.g., AB Report, supra note 1, 89-90.
22 The author does not intend, however, to expand the discussion of the WTO
and WTO dispute settlement process beyond the interaction between them and direct
taxation.
23 The GATT Council decision implementing the compromise over the
European territorial tax systems is Tax Legislation, Dec. 7-8, 1981, GATT B.I.S.D.
(28th Supp.) at 114 (1982). For the United States' arguments regarding the zero-rate
VAT (and a good summary of the U.S. tax subsidies controversy), see, e.g.,
Brumbaugh, supra note 1.
24 See, e.g., Gary Hufbauer, The Case of Mutating Tax Incentives: How Will the
DISCIESCIETI Drama End?, WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY (Apr. 8, 2002) (LEXIS,
FEDTAX lib., TNI file, elec. cit., 2002 WTD 67-5); Gary Hufbauer, The Foreign Sales
Corporation Drama: Reaching the Last Act?, WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY (Nov. 1, 2002)
(LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNI file, elec. cit., 2002 WTD 230-18).
25 The increasing power of other international economic arrangements amplifies
these constraints. For instance, EU members are bound by common VAT rules, the
prohibition of state aid, which has recently been enforced by the European
Commission, and other community restrictions.
2005]
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protectionism are increasing with globalization. It is therefore likely
that countries will try to employ protectionist techniques that escape
the tight WTO grip, such as income tax measures. Under some
circumstances, these countries may be willing to pay the price of the
potential negative effects that such measures may have on their
domestic tax policy. This article demonstrates that the present
international trade regime cannot deal satisfactorily with such
developments because of the (disconnect) between the trade regime
and the international tax regime.
This disconnect is detrimental to the international tax regime,
which for most purposes completely ignores the international trade
regime. Some commentators suggest that the international tax regime
that has evolved in the last half century around the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Model Tax
Convention (and currently consisting of more than 2000 bilateral tax
treaties, most of which closely follow the OECD model) should be
26
subjected to and embedded into the framework of the WTO. These
suggestions are the result of profound changes taking place in the
markets as globalization continues to thrive.
Despite the stability and effective functioning of the international
tax regime, it faces challenges because of the growth of global markets
and the associated need to regulate larger trade volumes and
increasingly sophisticated cross-border transactions involving multiple
countries, which often have conflicting claims to tax revenues from
such transactions. As such, the international tax regime will
eventually be required to evolve and incorporate (or be incorporated
21into) a central international policy forum or perhaps even a
supranational legal arrangement. This author has elaborated
elsewhere on some of these challenges and agreed with others that a
central international tax forum must be established, although not
28
necessarily under the canopy of the WTO. This author suggested,
alternatively, to build on the current success of the international
regime by creating an international tax organization, separate from
.the WTO, mainly because of the latter's different focus, lack of tax
expertise, political vulnerability, and insufficient compatibility with
26 Joel Slemrod & Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, (How) Should Trade Agreements Deal
with Income Tax Issues, 55 TAx L. REV. 533, 552-54 (2002).
27 See, e.g., Yariv Brauner, An International Tax Regime in Crystallization, 56
TAX L. REV. 259 (2003); Kees van Raad, International Coordination of Tax Treaty
Interpretation and Application, 29 INTERTAX 212, 218 (2001).
28 See Brauner, supra note 27, at 315-16.
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the fundamental norms of the present international tax regime.29
Implicitly, the original analysis ignored the potential clashes and
incompatibility of the international trade and tax regimes. The
present article adds this dimension, advocating a requirement that the
resulting international tax regime be constructed in compatibility with
WTO law but not subject to its dispute settlement process.3° The
article further provides observations on how such compatibility could
be achieved in a constructive and balanced manner, allowing both
regimes to continue to adapt to the changing realities without
clashing. This approach finds some support in the work of others,31
but it has not been elaborated on, and there is little scholarship on
point. Perhaps because of the limited practical relevance until
recently, no academic or other policy discourse existed, with the
exception of the U.S. tax export subsidy cases themselves.
To expand the scope of the discourse, this article explores and
then rejects an alternative solution model, which is based on the
premise that the trade and tax regimes are compatible. This solution
model is reconstructed from a lecture by Professor Paul McDaniel,
one of the nation's leading international tax experts, which was more
limited in scope and suggested a similar solution in the context of the
312export subsidies rules. Professor McDaniel's model uses the logic
and actual analysis of the domestic tax expenditure budgets to divide
"jurisdiction" over income tax measures between the international tax
and trade regimes. According to that model, tax expenditures would
be subject to WTO law and the WTO dispute settlement process,
while other income tax measures would be immune from it. This
solution model has a strong appeal due to its apparent clarity and
objectivity, as demonstrated by language of the WTO dispute
settlement body supporting a similar line of thought.1
3
This article argues that this appeal is illusory and that the above-
mentioned solution model is not practically workable. Moreover, this
article demonstrates that even if it were workable, it would be
29 Id.
30 On this point, this paper agrees with Professor Green, see Robert A. Green,
Antilegalistic Approaches to Resolving Disputes Between Governments: A Comparison
of the International Tax and Trade Regimes, 23 YALE J. INT'L L. 79, 137-39 (1998).
3 See id.
32 McDaniel, supra note 7.
33 AB Report, supra note 1, 89. In consecutive paragraphs the AB struggles,
however, with the practical difficulty of usefully implementing this logic,
acknowledging the difficulty but avoiding the analysis of the feasibility of the tests
that it was trying to dictate. Id. $$ 90-91.
2005] 259
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undesirable because it may corrupt whatever usefulness the domestic
tax expenditure budget may have and introduce inefficiencies to both
the international trade and tax regimes. The reconstruction of this
solution and its critique are presented in Part IV of this article.
Part II sets the background for the discussion with a review of the
likely scope of application of the current WTO law to direct taxation.
It concludes that the scope of such application, except for direct and
blunt tax subsidies, is likely to be limited at best. It further establishes
the present dividing line between direct taxation and trade rules and
explains why such a vague and possibly unsatisfactory division
evolved.
Part III establishes the theoretically large potential scope of
application of WTO law to direct taxation, in contrast to its limited
actual current scope. This demonstrates the importance of the
discussion in this article and the fragility of the current uncertain
relationship of these two concepts. It further demonstrates the
practical impossibility of reconciling the international trade and
international tax regimes without completely overhauling one or both
regimes.
Part IV rejects the constructed tax expenditure solution model.
Part V concludes with some observations about a reasonable
alternative route of international policy coordination that may not be
able to reconcile tax and trade law, but should be able to coordinate
tax and trade law policies and implement a workable legal framework
for such policy coordination.
II. THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TAX AND TRADE
WTO law is the most developed source of international economic
law. It nominally covers most international economic activities,
although it is limited in scope in some cases. The rules related to the
trade in goods, embedded primarily in the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATI), 4 are the most developed set of rules,
forming a fairly coherent body of law. The rules related to trade in
services took a parallel path through the General Agreement on
Trade in Services (GATS), a similar but not identical agreement to
GATT. Both are part of international law, but possess many
characteristics of supranational laws and operate as such. The
increasingly important international investment and trade in
34 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 187,
T.I.A.S. 1700 [hereinafter GATT].
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intellectual property are also being included in the framework of the
WTO, but have yet to develop within this framework to the extent
that trade in goods and services has.35
The primary goal and interest of WTO law is the promotion and
facilitation of free trade. The WTO operates in a virtual international
economic space; or, if one wishes, it serves as an interface between the
various legal systems, operating to reduce or eliminate barriers to
trade. In general, it does not directly modify or relate to specific
domestic regulation, but rather dictates standards to which the
member countries align their domestic laws.
The current international tax regime, on the other hand, is based
on a complex yet well-established, widespread, and fairly coherent
network of more than 2000 bilateral tax treaties. It clearly is not a
supranational body of law, but it is an integral part of international
law.36 The regime's main goal has always been to relieve double
(over) taxation. More recently, the regime has also begun to correct
for non (under) taxation.37  It does that primarily by direct
modification, on a case-by-case basis, of specific domestic tax rules as
they apply to cross-border transactions involving only the two
countries who are parties to the relevant treaty.
These differences in both form and substance cannot mask the
intimate relationship between the two regimes. Direct tax is a barrier
to trade, yet it must be levied to finance government activities, at least
as long as other sources of revenues are not available or sufficient.38
The direct consequence is that taxation is and will remain, for as long
as the current political reality persists, a constant barrier to trade that
cannot be completely eliminated. Thus, the ideal of free trade cannot
be fully achieved in a world with taxes. A second-best regime - one
that would account for taxation - had to be established as a result.39
35 International investment is regulated through a recently evolved network of
bilateral investments treaties. See, e.g., Contemporary Practice of the United States
Relating to International Law: International Economic Law: Proposed New U.S.
"Model" Bilateral Investment Treaty, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 836 (2004).
36 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, International Tax as International Law (Mar.
2004) (unpublished research paper), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstractid=516382.
37 See Michael Lang, General Report, in CAHIERS DE DROIT FISCAL
INTERNATIONAL, STUDIES ON INTERNATIONAL FISCAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL
FISCAL ASSOCIATION: VOLUME 89A-DOUBLE NON-TAXATION 73-119 (2004).
38 The debate over the appropriate extent and nature of such services, although
central to tax policy making, is beyond the scope of this article. It is sufficient to
assume that some taxes are acceptably required.
39 One can, of course, take the view of Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel, who
20051
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Despite this strong and direct connection, most countries
(including the United States) do not coordinate their trade and tax
regimes. As best expressed by one U.S. scholar, "[t]his country's tax
framework is about as poorly adapted to GATT as is imaginable." 40
This Part of the article elaborates on this observation and identifies
the areas of potential conflicts, setting the stage for a later discussion
of the measures that might be taken to alleviate or reduce such
conflicts.
A. Format and Legal Status
First, the legal constructs of the two regimes differ in their
formats. In the United States, WTO agreements41 take the form of
"executive agreements, 42 adopted by the President. As such, they
only view entitlements after-tax, see LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF
OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND JUSTICE 32-34 (2002), but this view does not contribute to
the solution of our problem. Simply put, as long as different countries apply different
taxes, these differences will affect trade.
. 40 Richard A. Westin, Modifying the U.S. Tax Framework to Stimulate
Employment Without Violating GATT Principles, WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY (May 3,
2004) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNI file, elec. cit., 2004 WTD 85-17).
41 For instance, all the agreements subjected to the Marrakesh declaration of
1994.
42 That is, it is a "treaty," as understood by international law, even though it was
concluded by the U.S. President alone, without "advice and consent" of two-thirds of
the U.S. Senate, as required for a U.S. treaty by the U.S. Constitution. U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 2, cl. 2. For a summary of the authorities, see the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 111 (1987). In general, the U.S. Congress is granted the
power to regulate U.S. international economic relations by the U.S. Constitution, U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, but since the 1930s Congress has delegated power to the
President to enter into international trade agreements. It was under this authority
that GATT (and consecutive tariff agreements) were negotiated and signed by the
United States. The power of the President to enter into such agreements has been
affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942);
United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937); see also U.S. Dep't of State
Circular No. 175 (Dec. 13, 1955), reprinted in 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 784, 785 (1956)
(discussing the proper treaty-making and executive-agreement making powers of the
United States); Myres S. McDougal & Asher Lans, Treaties and Congressional-
Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy,
54 YALE L.J. 181, 187 (1945) (stressing the traditional interchangeability of treaties
and executive agreements and the identity of their legal consequences in the area of
international commerce). Some have challenged the appropriateness of the
President's choice not to seek advice or consent from the Senate when concluding
WTO agreements, a choice the boundaries of which are unclear under present law.
See The World Trade Organization and U.S. Sovereignty: Hearings before the Senate
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 103d Cong. (1994) (testimony of Ralph Nader, Center
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constitute an international obligation of the United States,43 yet are
not "self-executing."44 Their execution depends on their
transformation (implementation) into domestic legislation, without
which they cannot be relied upon in a U.S. court or tribunal. There is
a debate among U.S. constitutional experts as to the scope of the
presidential power to conclude executive agreements. 45 However, it is
now accepted that WTO agreements are outside the scope of this
debate, following broad congressional approval46 and the adoption of
their implementing Act. It should be noted that the implementation
of these agreements was not complete because, as provided in the
implementing Act, the agreements do not supersede other U.S. laws.47
Similarly, WTO dispute settlement body decisions do not constitute
48self-executing international obligations of the United States because
for Responsible Law). The President did get general approval from Congress to enter
into the negotiation in a special process known as "fast track" that does not allow
amendments, for instance. The Uruguay Round Agreements were finally approved in
the Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809
(codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 3511 (2005)) [hereinafter Uruguay Round
Agreements Act]. The "fast track" authority for nontariff barrier negotiations was
originally established in the Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978
(codified as amended in 19 U.S.C. § 2111 et seq. (2005)) [hereinafter Trade Act], and
satisfactorily used thereafter in the implementation of the Tokyo Round.
43 Note that GATT was entered into by the President as an executive agreement
and never explicitly approved by Congress. Now, as part of Annex 1 to the WTO
Agreement, GAT is part of the WTO agreements. See Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, THE RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTS 5
(1994), 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement]. The courts, however,
have consistently applied the rules of GATT in many cases.
44 An executive agreement could theoretically be self-executing and have direct
effect as if it were a regular domestic law, but the Uruguay Round Agreements Act
provides specifically that these agreements are not self-executing. See Uruguay
Round Agreements Act § 102.
45 These could follow several legislative paths. See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
RELATIONS 83 (2d ed. 1997). For the more specific authority of the President, see id.
at 90-91.
46 Including more than two-thirds of the Senate, which is the supermajority
required in the case of regular treaties. Uruguay Round Agreements Act § 101(a).
The status of GATT prior to the establishment of the WTO was not in doubt,
although the legal basis for its stability was not sound. See Ronald A. Brand, The
Status of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in United States Domestic Law,
26 STAN. J. INT'L L. 479, 480 (1990).
47 Uruguay Round Agreements Act § 102(a)(1).
48 WTO Agreement, supra note 43, art. XVI. This is one of the major
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they generally require separate domestic implementing legislation.49
The lingering failure of the U.S. Congress to repeal the ETI regime is
a primary example of United States' direct confrontation and
noncompliance with the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding
(DSU), ° which clearly reflects the present limitations of the WTO
supranational powers.
In contrast to the multilateral WTO agreements, income tax
treaties, including those of the United States, are bilateral. They
normally follow the globally accepted OECD model tax treaty,51
52
complemented by a very similar, U.S.-exclusive model. Unlike the
U.S. trade agreements,53 the U.S. bilateral tax treaties have
traditionally followed the conservative track of a "treaty," rather than
differences between the GATT and WTO dispute resolution processes, and one that
was strongly advocated by the United States.
49 That is, unless it is otherwise within the power of the executive branch to
respect the relevant obligation. A relevant example is the FSC Repeal and
Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-519, 114 Stat. 2423.
50 Before the WTO, the United States' compliance with such decisions under
GATT has been criticized as unsatisfactory. The United States itself complained
about the insufficient authority of the GATT dispute settlement process, leading to
the constitution of the WTO DSU. Professor Hudec noted that the U.S. policy in the
1980s and 1990s was to delay and even block the adoption of some of these decisions
by the GATT Council (or Code Committee). Robert E. Hudec, The New WTO
Dispute Settlement Procedure: An Overview of the First Three Years, 8 MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 1, 13 (1999). The DISC case started this as the epitome of the
weaknesses of the GATI dispute settlement system. See JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL.,
LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 267 (4th ed. 2002)
[hereinafter JACKSON CASEBOOK]; see also John H. Jackson, The Jurisprudence of
International Trade: The DISC (Domestic International Sales Corporations) Case in
GATT, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 747 (1978).
51 ARTICLES OF THE MODEL CONVENTION WITH RESPECT TO TAXES ON INCOME
AND ON CAPITAL (Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev. 2003), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/34/1914467.pdf [hereinafter OECD MODEL TAX
TREATY].
52 U.S. MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION OF SEPT. 20, 1996 (U.S. Dep't of
Treasury 1996), available at http://www.treas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/model996
.pdf [hereinafter U.S. MODEL TAX TREATY]. The purpose of the model is to facilitate
and serve as a general guideline for negotiations of U.S. bilateral tax treaties. It self-
admittedly has a strong identity to the OECD model and does not represent any lack
of U.S. support of that model. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, UNITED STATES
MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION OF SEPTEMBER 20, 1996: TECHNICAL
EXPLANATION, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-trty/usmtech.pdf.
53 Both multilateral and bilateral trade agreements have become more favorable
lately as the administration's confidence in the WTO diminishes and the frustration
from the stalled new round of negotiations increases.
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an "executive agreement," which is to say they are concluded by the
executive branch ad referendum, and ratified by the Senate.54 Once
ratified and entered into force, such bilateral tax treaties are equal in
status but not superior to other statutes or treaties. Thus they are
subject, for instance, to the "later in time" rule, meaning that they
may be overridden by subsequently enacted legislation or
subsequently ratified treaties.5 To avoid antagonizing treaty partners,
the possibility of override is softened by the requirement that a
subsequent statute must specifically acknowledge overriding a treaty
to be given such effect. 56 Trade executive agreements and tax treaties
are, therefore, different in form. In practice, however, the prevailing
opinion is that both are of the same status.5 7
As previously mentioned, the investment sector is currently
covered, in large part, by bilateral investment agreements and some
multilateral arrangements such as the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA).58 In this respect the international investment
54 After the conclusion and negotiation of the treaty, it is typically signed by the
negotiator for the government of the United States, then the President transmits it to
the Senate, seeking its "advice and consent," which practically requires a
supermajority of two-thirds of the Senate. If the Senate advises ratification, the
President may then ratify the treaty. Once the instruments of ratification are
exchanged with the treaty partner, the President proclaims the treaty and it enters
into force as "the supreme law of the land," as per the U.S. Constitution. U.S. CONST.
art. VI, cl. 2; see also Samann v. Commissioner, 313 F.2d 461, 463 (4th Cir. 1963). For
an illustration of the typical process see, e.g., the old U.S.-Japan income tax treaty,
Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Mar. 8, 1971, U.S.-Japan,
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-trty/apan.pdf.
55 See, e.g., Richard L. Doernberg, Overriding Tax Treaties: The U.S. Perspective,
9 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 71,114 (1995).
56 Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1988); Cook v. United States, 288
U.S. 102, 120 (1933); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 115
(1987).
57 A possible caveat to this equality is the requirement that a court first attempt
to reconcile any treaty with a possibly conflicting statute, or another treaty, in
acknowledgement of the treaty being an international obligation of the United States.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 114 (1987). For
completeness, note also that both treaties and executive agreements prevail over state
laws in general. JACKSON CASEBOOK, supra note 50, at 104-05.
58 North American Free Trade Agreement, art. 1103, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17,
1992, 32 I.L.M. 605, 639 (1994), available at http://www.nafta-sec-
alena.org/DefaultSite/index-e.aspx?DetaillD=160#Al103 (last visited July 10, 2005)
[hereinafter NAFTA]. Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) have become very
popular lately and they typically include a MFN obligation very similar to the above.
See MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY (U.S. Dep't of State 2004), art. 4,
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/29030.doc. A full list of the
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regime is very similar to the international tax regime. Since the
direction of the investment regime does not seem clear at the present,
the relationship between the international tax regime and the
investment arrangements will not be covered in detail. It is a worthy
project for the future.
B. Nondiscrimination as a Unifying Obligation
The different formats of the trade and tax regimes are not of
particular concern to a reconciliation attempt. Consequently, the bulk
of the following discussion will focus on the substantive
incompatibility of the subject regimes. The "heart and soul" of the
WTO law is its nondiscrimination obligation. As a multilateral regime
attempting to eliminate barriers to trade, the WTO attempts to
minimize domestic barriers and require that the associated benefits be
granted to all the subjects of the regime. The current belief, which has
largely proven true, is that countries would agree to concessions or
compromises in a multilateral arrangement that they would never
have made in a narrower context of a bilateral network. To make the
elimination of trade barriers politically easier to digest and to pay
respect to national sovereignty, there is no general nonqualified
nondiscrimination rule, but rather two separate requirements. One,
termed "national treatment," forbids countries from treating some
countries differently than they treat other countries.; the other, "most
favored nation status" (MFN), forbids countries from treating
residents of some countries differently than they treat residents of
other countries. Together, these requirements, while ignoring
discrimination against one's own nationals, amount to a general
nondiscrimination rule to be adhered to without qualification. In
reality, however, such adherence is rarely satisfied.
The international tax regime, on the other hand, typically only
forbids discrimination against foreigners as compared to domestic
persons. Moreover, the prohibition applies separately to each set of
bilateral treaty partners. It is similar in meaning to the WTO national
treatment requirement, ensuring a level playing field, but limited to
the extent agreed upon in each bilateral setting. In theory, therefore,
there is no expectation for global convergence of tax treatments since
each bilateral setting should produce a different negotiated outcome
that presumably maximizes the benefits to the participating countries
in that particular situation. In reality, the development and
U.S. BITs is available at http://www.tcc.mac.doc.gov.
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crystallization of the current international tax regime and the relative
convergence of the rules along the lines of the OECD model 9 have
produced an outcome that is close to, albeit not actually, a global level
playing field. The absence of an MFN obligation in bilateral tax
treaties may be explained by the treaties' bilateral natures. Although
theoretically they may include an MFN provision of some sort,
bilateral tax treaties are usually struck in an exclusive bilateral setting,
generally ignoring other countries' interests and concerns.
To sum up, the international trade regime includes both MFN and
national treatment requirements. In contrast, the international tax
regime, which regulates a major barrier to trade, requires only
national treatment. The result is that adherence to the international
tax regime may not allow the strict application of the MFN
requirement - a fundamental principle of the international trade
regime. This difficulty is further complicated by the limited
application of WTO law in various circumstances, and specifically the
limited application of its nondiscrimination provisions in
circumstances where WTO law clearly governs. These limitations
should be discussed separately in order to better understand the
extent of the incompatibility of the subject regimes.
1. MFN
The MFN clause ensures that a country does not discriminate
among a group of foreigners from various other countries who are
parties to the relevant agreement. This clause is a fundamental pillar
of the WTO regime, and is symbolically placed in Article I of GATIT.
Its application is natural in the context of tariff concessions, the
traditional focal point of GATT, but less natural in the context of
income taxes. Article I of GATT applies to any taxes that affect
imports and exports. 60 Conceptually, it is therefore plausible to apply
Article I to income tax measures that affect imports or exports. One
must remember, however, that GATT applies only in the context of
"like" products, and therefore application of GATT to income tax
measures is limited to the extent that such measures affect imports or
59 Brauner, supra note 27, at 263.
60 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. Article I includes a specific reference to Article III
matters (internal taxes and government regulations), which makes its interpretation
dependent on the interpretation of Article III as far as the relevant taxes are
concerned, i.e. indirect taxes. See GATT art. I.
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exports of like products. Other than that, GATT contains no specific
limitations or carve-outs for income tax measures.
In contrast, the international trade-in-services regime includes
specific limitations and carve-outs as far as its applicability to income
taxes. Article II of GATS also includes an MFN provision. This
provision is limited, however, by the general scope of GATS, which,
unlike GATT, is an "opt-in" (disguised as an "opt-out") regime. In
GATS, each country's obligations are contained in the schedules,
62including the MFN exemptions schedule. The schedules limit
countries' specific commitments in order to soften the unconditional
nature of the general MFN obligations. This is most often done with
respect to industries where a significant difference in the degree of
openness in the countries' economies could mean that reciprocity is
unlikely to be satisfactory. 63  The U.S. list of MIFN exemptions
includes, for instance, an important insistence on control over
immigration, despite its major role in the assurance of free trade in
services;64 traditional exemptions for some land use and transport
services; major exemptions for the politically strong financial services
and telecommunication industries; exemptions for taxation measures,
including special direct tax benefits (or denial thereof) to specific
65 66
countries and industries; and, in some cases, exemptions for state
and local tax benefits. These limitations likely target measures that
may be outside the scope of a bilateral tax treaty and are therefore
viewed as needing another level of protection from the strict
application of GATS' general MFN provision.
Article II of GATS is supported by a dispute resolution
procedure in Article XXII. Article XXII:3 provides an internal
limitation on the relevance of Article II to direct taxation by
61 As there is a general agreement that "like" does not have to be interpreted
similarly on different occasions when it might be a crucial determinant in GATT, it is
possible that different interpretations would apply in different circumstances.
62 The U.S. commitment to GATS is relatively significant, as the United States
acknowledged the importance of the trade in services to its economy, which is only
bound to grow.
63 In reality, the main benefactors were the politically well-connected financial
services and telecommunications industries.
64 The United States has clarified in a study submitted to GATT that it would
not negotiate immigration issues in international trade forums. JACKSON CASEBOOK,
supra note 50, at 862-63.
65 Examples include Canada, Mexico, U.S. possessions, and the Caribbean Basin
Initiative. Denial of benefits is also possible for foreign policy reasons, for instance to
countries that participate or cooperate with an international boycott.
66 Examples are transportation, communication, and in some cases, advertising.
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specifically excluding measures covered by bilateral tax treaties.6 ' A
second internal limitation is found in Article XIV(e) of GATS, which
provides a specific exemption from the Article II MEN obligation so
long as the difference in treatment (discrimination) is the result of
application of a bilateral tax treaty.68 In practice, the United States
seems to interpret the above as general immunity exempting any tax
measures contained in its bilateral tax treaties from the GATS' MFN
obligations.
As noted above, the current international tax regime 69 does not
• • 70
generally contain an MFN provision. Some specific treaties,
however, contain provisions with similar effects. One example is
Article XXV:2 of the U.S.-Canada bilateral tax treaty, which is an
MFN-type obligation with respect to "taxation or any requirement
connected therewith." The standard used is that treatment "other or
more burdensome" than the tax treatment of domestic taxpayers is
prohibited in that bilateral setting.7' The third NAFTA member -
Mexico - secured a more limited MFN-type provision in the 2003
protocol to its 1992 bilateral tax treaty with the United States. With
67 General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, art. XIV, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, THE RESULTS OF
THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTS
325 (1994), 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.L.M. 1167 (1994) [hereinafter GATS], art III
XXII:3.
The exemption is denied if the discrimination is "arbitrary or unjustifiable" or
is a "disguised restriction." GATS, supra note 67. This caveat seems meaningless,
however, and has never been triggered to the best of this author's knowledge.
69 Based primarily on the network of over 2000 bilateral tax treaties worldwide.
See Avi-Yonah, supra note 17, at 169.
70 It does however contain a nondiscrimination obligation, dating back to Article
15 of the original League of Nations Model Tax Treaty of 1943. This obligation is
standard: the equalization of domestic tax treatment of foreigners resident in the
country of the treaty partner to that of domestic taxpayers, subject to certain
exceptions, such as taxation by withholding. There was some debate over the level of
neutrality required in this context, but that is irrelevant to our purposes. This
obligation is similar, but stricter, than the "national treatment" obligation, which is
the other major antidiscrimination measure of GATT, elaborated on in the next Part,
as it does not forbid discrimination against foreign investors, for instance. See Green,
supra note 30, at 88-89, 91-92.
71 Convention Regarding Double Taxation: Taxes on Income and Capital, Sept.
26, 1980-Mar. 28, 1984, U.S.-Can., art. XXV, T.I.A.S. No. 11,087, at 23. The complete
equalization of tax treatment implied by the addition of the word "other" is unique
insofar as the normal bilateral tax treaty standard, including the U.S. model, which
only protects from a more burdensome treatment. In practice, the "other or more
burdensome" standard is obviously not strictly observed.
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the added protocol, the United States is obligated to negotiate an
equalizing protocol with Mexico should it grant a better treatment of
dividend income to another country.72 Apart from NAFTA, Article
13(2)(b)(iii) of the 1976 U.S.-Philippines bilateral tax treaty provides
for a one-sided MFN obligation of the Philippines to ensure that its
withholding tax rate on royalties paid to U.S. residents is the lowest
rate allowed by law under similar circumstances. 
73
Another, less direct, MFN-type treatment is the U.S. allowance of
EU ownership to count towards "domestic" ownership of its EU
treaty partners for purposes of the limitation of benefits articles in theS74
respective treaties. Interestingly, none of the above articles use the
term "MFN" in either the text or the technical explanation of each
treaty.
Despite these exceptions, the accepted norm is still to exclude
MiFN obligations from bilateral tax treaties. A provision found in
most recent U.S. bilateral tax treaties,75 derived from Article 1(3)(b)
72 Second Additional Protocol that Modifies the Convention for the Avoidance
of Double Taxation, Nov. 25, 2002, U.S.-Mex., art. II(b), S. TREATY Doc. No. 108-3
(2003) (replacing paragraph 8 of the original 1992 protocol).
73 Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income, Oct. 1, 1976, U.S.-Phil., art.
13(2)(b)(iii), 34 U.S.T. 1277. This provision was implicated lately when the
Philippines granted such lower rate to China, thereby requiring it to reduce the rate
for royalty payments to U.S. residents. See Benedicta Du-Baladad, Lower Royalty
Rate May Apply Under Philippines-U.S. Tax Treaty, WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY (July
12, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNI file, elec. cit., 2002 WTD 134-4).
74 See, e.g., Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, July 24, 2001,
U.S.-U.K., art. 23(7)(d), S. TREATY Doc. No. 107-19 (2003). EU implications are
beyond the scope of this article. This is not, however, exactly an MFN obligation and
is limited to this anti-treaty shopping provision that, at least until the recent expansion
of the EU, did not bother the United States much in these circumstances.
75 See Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, U.S.-Italy, art.
3(1)(b), Aug. 25, 1999, S. TREATY Doc. No. 106-11 (1999); Convention for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation, U.S.-Den., art. 1(3)(b), Aug. 19, 1999, S. TREATY
Doc. No. 106-12 (2003); Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, U.S.-
Slovn., art. 1(3)(b), June 21, 1999, S. TREATY Doc. No. 106-9 (1999); Convention for
the Avoidance of Double Taxation, U.S.-Venez., art. 1(3)(b), Jan. 25, 1999, S.
TREATY Doc. No. 106-3 (1999); Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation,
U.S.-Est., art. 1(3)(b), Jan. 15, 1998, S. TREATY DOC. No. 105-55 (1999); Convention
for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, U.S.-Lat., art. 1(3)(b), Jan. 15, 1998, S.
TREATY Doc. NO. 105-57 (1999); Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation,
U.S.-Lith., art. 1(3)(b), Jan. 15, 1998, S. TREATY Doc. No. 105-56 (1998); Convention
for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, U.S.-Ir., art. 1(3)(a)(ii), July 28, 1997, S.
TREATY Doc. No. 106-15 (1999); Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation,
U.S.-S. Afr., art. 1(3)(b), Feb. 17, 1997, S. TREATY Doc. No. 105-9 (1997); Convention
for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, U.S.-Thail., art. 1(5)(b), Nov. 26, 1996, S.
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of the 1996 U.S. Model Tax Treaty, further augments this
understanding:
[U]nless the competent authorities determine that a taxation
measure is not within the scope of this Convention, the
nondiscrimination obligations of this Convention exclusively
shall apply with respect to that measure, except for such
national treatment or most-favored-nation obligations as may
apply to trade in goods under the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade. No national treatment or most-favored-
nation obligation under any other agreement shall apply with
respect to that measure. 76
TREATY Doc. No. 105-2 (1997); Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation,
U.S.-Switz., art. 28(2)(b), Oct. 2, 1996, S. TREATY Doc. No. 105-8 (1997); Convention
for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, U.S.-Aus., art. 1(3)(b), May 31, 1996, S.
TREATY Doc. No. 104-31 (1997); Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation,
U.S.-Lux., art. 1(5)(b), Apr. 3, 1996, S. TREATY Doc. No. 104-33 (1997); Convention
for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, U.S.-Turk., art. 1(5)(b), Mar. 28, 1996, S.
TREATY Doc. No. 104-30 (1997); Protocol to the Convention for the Avoidance of
Double Taxation, U.S.-Port., art. 1(a)(iii), Sept. 6, 1994, S. TREATY Doc. No. 103-34
(1995); Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, U.S.-Swed., art. 1(3)(b),
Sept. 1, 1994, S. TREATY Doc. No. 103-29 (1995); Convention for the Avoidance of
Double Taxation, U.S.-Fr., art. 29(8)(b), Aug. 31, 1994, S. TREATY DOc. No. 103-32
(1995). The 1993 tax convention with Kazakhstan provides, in the exchange of notes,
somewhat differently that the bilateral tax treaties' mutual agreement procedure in
Article 25 has exclusivity over any GATS application to a measure that is within the
scope of the bilateral tax treaty. See Convention for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation, U.S.-Kaz., Oct. 24, 1993, S. TREATY Doc. No. 104-15 (1996). This provision
was, of course, drafted prior to the conclusion, but with the expectation of the
conclusion of GATS, and prior to the publication of the U.S. Model Income Tax
Treaty in 1996.
76 RICHARD L. DOERNBERG & KEES VAN RAAD, THE 1996 UNITED STATES
MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION: ANALYSIS, COMMENTARY AND COMPARISON 6
(1997). The Treasury Department's technical explanation of this provision elaborates:
[U]nless the competent authorities determine that a taxation measure is not
within the scope of this Convention, the nondiscrimination obligations of
this Convention exclusively shall apply with respect to that measure, except
for such national treatment or most-favored-nation ("MFN") obligations as
may apply to trade in goods under the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade ("GATT"). No national treatment or MFN obligation under any
other agreement shall apply with respect to that measure. Thus, unless the
competent authorities agree otherwise, any national treatment and MFN
obligations undertaken by the Contracting States under agreements other
than the Convention shall not apply to a taxation measure, with the
exception of GATT as applicable to trade in goods.
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This provision clarifies the preemption of bilateral tax treaties'
nondiscrimination provision by any other possible nondiscrimination
obligations that may apply to tax measures within the scope of the
relevant bilateral tax treaty. This exclusive application is not absolute,
however. The antidiscrimination obligations in GATT, specifically
limited to "trade in goods," continue to apply in parallel.77
Note that Article 1(3)(b) of the U.S. Model Tax Treaty is not
coherent78 and lacks an obvious purpose. It is difficult to see what is
different about GATT in this context. A possible explanation for
singling out GATT's dispute settlement procedure as equal to that of
the bilateral tax treaties may be that it was inconceivable that
significant income tax disputes would arise under GATT, in contrast
to the possibility of such disputes under the Agreement on Trade-
Related Investment Measures (TRIM) or GATS. 79 TRIM and GATS,
unlike Articles I and III of GATT, expressly apply to direct taxes.
Another possible, but unlikely, interpretation is that the above
exception was intended to open the door for future application of
GATT's MFN obligation to direct tax measures.
The Internal Revenue Code (Code) does not include
nondiscrimination provisions. In fact, it contains unique, and
potentially discriminatory, provisions applicable to foreigners.80
Despite the lack of nondiscrimination provisions in the Code itself, it
explicitly refers, under certain circumstances, to bilateral tax treaties
- an indirect and even awkward reference to their nondiscrimination
obligations. 8' U.S. domestic law also provides for MFN treatment for
Id. at 280.
77 Note that the above provision does not coordinate GATT and bilateral tax
treaties, but rather declares their independence from each other.
78 See, e.g., DOERNBERG & VAN RAAD, supra note 76, at 10 n.32.
79 The trade in services is extremely important to the U.S. economy. It
represents most of the U.S. output and almost all of its growth at the end of the last
millennium. It also presents challenges to important domestic issues, such as
immigration, investment, and regulatory policies, which may not be greatly affected
by the international trade in goods.
80 Foreign persons are subject to taxes by withholding, imposed on the gross
amount of the income item, whereas domestic taxpayers may be taxed more lightly
due to the "normal" net income taxation. The Internal Revenue Code (Code) may
limit certain deductions to foreigners in situations where these deductions would be
allowed to domestic taxpayers. See I.R.C. § 1630). The Code also provides for
certain retaliatory devices which have never been supported with regulations and
have never been applied. See I.R.C. §§ 891, 896.
81 I.R.C. §§ 894(a)(1), 897(i), 884(e)(1), 906(a).
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most imports. For political reasons, however, certain countries are
denied such treatment when tariffs are concerned. 83 Other exceptions
to this general rule include sections 301 through 310 of the Trade Act
of 1974," the U.S. free trade agreements, 85 and the Generalized
System of Preferences for developing countries. The United States
had provided this treatment even prior to the post-World War II trade
talks, while always stressing the importance of reciprocity. The
expectation for reciprocity practically created a conditional MFN - a
concept that was largely rejected in the realm of GATT and WTO.
In conclusion, the combination of Article 1(3)(b) of the U.S.
Model Tax Treaty with similar provisions in specific tax treaties, all of
which exclude direct taxes from GATS' nondiscrimination
87provisions, reflects the U.S. position that bilateral tax treaties are
superior to trade agreements with regard to direct taxation. GATT is
most likely excluded because it is not expected to have an actual effect
on direct taxation in the United States.88 This expectation was proven
wrong with the outcome of the recent ETI case, which rejected the
U.S. position.
2. National Treatment
The other major antidiscrimination norm in WTO law does
resemble the tax nondiscrimination provisions. This is the "national
treatment" obligation, which prohibits discriminatory and
protectionist taxation, among other things. Article III of GATT is its
81general national treatment provision. It is normally understood to
82 Trade Act, supra note 42, § 126(a), 88 Stat. 1978 (codified as amended at 19
U.S.C. § 2136 (2000)).
83 U.S. HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE, General Note 3(a) (2001), available at
http://www.usitc.gov/tata/hts/archive/0100/0100GN.PDF. This exception also used to
include the communist countries during the Cold War.
Trade Act, supra note 44, §§ 301-10.
85 For a list and full text of these agreements, see http://www.ustr.gov/
TradeAgreements/Bilateral/SectionIndex.html.
86 For a short explanation of the GSP, see http://www.unctad.org/Templates/
Page.asp?intltemlD=2309&lang=l. The waiver document itself is available at
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/misc/gsp.pdf. For the U.S. position regarding this
agreement, see http://www.itds.treas.gov/gsp.html.
" See, e.g., Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, U.S.-Kaz., Oct.
24, 1993, S. TREATY Doc. No. 104-15 (1996).
The sources of this exception may be political or may follow Lennard's
estoppel argument. See Lennard, supra note 6.
89 For a good recent review and analysis of WTO law regarding GATT Article
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apply only to indirect, rather than income, taxation, yet such an
interpretation is implicit and is not clear from the language of the
provision. 90 It is useful, however, to understand the basic principles of
the national treatment obligation if one wishes to reconcile them with
the rules in bilateral tax treaties in a clear and constructive manner.
GATT's Article 111:2 prohibits discrimination against imported
goods by the means of internal (nontariff) taxes.9 Discrimination is
measured by comparison between the treatment of the imported
goods and "like" domestic products. The determination of "likeness"
is obviously crucial and, not surprisingly, has been a central area of
dispute throughout the years. The dispute settlement body has not
been successful in dealing with this determination. Its general rhetoric
has been to apply rather mechanically, and as objectively as possible, a
"likeness" of products test. On the other hand, the U.S. challenge of
Japan in the alcoholic beverages case employed a broad,
nonmechanistic interpretation of the "likeness" term, arguing for the
need to determine the protectionist "aim or effect" of likeness.92
Recent cases, however, reflect the rhetoric of the objective approach,
rejecting the need for the "aim or effect" determination to determine
likeness.93  Despite this seeming preference for the objective
approach, the dispute settlement body continues to consider
subjective factors in its attempt to distinguish between bona fide and
illegitimate regulatory measures.94
1II, see Henrik Horn & Petros C. Mavroidis, Still Hazy After All These Years: The
Interpretation of National Treatment in the GA TT/WTO Case-law on Tax
Discrimination, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 39 (2004).
90 GATI SECRETARIAT, ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND
PRACTICE 133 (6th ed. 1994).
91 See GATT, supra note 60 at art. III, para. 2. This provision, like the national
treatment principle, was incorporated into GATT on the insistence of the United
States. See Michael J. Trebilcock & Shiva K. Giri, The National Treatment Principle
in International Trade Law 1-2 (Am. Law & Econ. Ass'n 14th Annual Meeting,
Working Paper No. 8, 2004), available at http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art8 (last
visited June 9, 2005).
92 JACKSON CASEBOOK, supra note 50, at 494, 500-02.
93 See Robert E. Hudec, GATT/WTO Constraints on National Regulation: A
Requiem for an "Aim and Effects" Test, 32 INT'L LAW. 619 (1998); Donald Regan,
Further Thoughts on the Role of Regulatory Purpose Under Article III of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: A Tribute to Bob Hudec, 37 J. WORLD TRADE 737
(2003); Frieder Roessler, Beyond the Ostensible: A Tribute to Professor Robert
Hudec's Insights on the Determination of the Likeness of Products Under the National
Treatment Provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 37 J. WORLD
TRADE 771 (2003); see also TREBILCOCK & GIRl, supra note 91, at 17.
94 See Hudec, supra note 93, at 633-36.
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Determining whether two goods are "alike" is irrelevant for the
purposes of the federal income tax.9 The same is true regarding the
second sentence of GATT's Article 111:2, which extends the national
treatment to products not necessarily "alike" but nonetheless "in
competition" with the imported goods. Some have advocated the use
96
of antitrust concepts in these inquiries, but this should not affect the
nonrelevance of the "likeness" test to direct taxation in the United
States. In addition, the same treaty rules (Article 1(3)(b) of the U.S.
Model Tax Treaty in particular) that were discussed with regard to the
MFN provisions of GATT and GATS should apply here (for example,
the rule that when applicable, bilateral tax treaties trump GATS and
operate in parallel to GATT obligations, which are not likely to be
material in this context).
97
In GATS, Article XVII provides for national treatment within the
98boundaries set in each member country's schedules of commitments.
The U.S. specific commitments in GATS include most of the major
services and some expected traditional limitations, such as those on
professional services (legal, accounting, engineering, etc.), and a
variety of policy specific limitations, including the denial of some
direct tax benefits. More significant are the supplements reserving
special treatment to the financial and telecommunication services
industries. Article XVII:1 further provides that the national
treatment applies to all measures affecting the supply of services. 99
"Measures" are defined in Article XXVIII(a) widely, encompassing
laws, regulations, rules, procedures, decisions, administrative actions,
or any other form.1°" The discrimination test is consequential in that
"less favorable treatment" is measured by the effect of the relevant
measure on the "conditions of competition." The form of treatment
of foreign services or service suppliers is not a conclusive indication of
discrimination: depending on the circumstances, identical formal
treatment may or may not be discriminatory.'0 1 In the negotiation of
95 Even if Article III were interpreted to apply to direct taxation, it probably
would not matter much since direct taxation is not commonly used for protectionism.
This could change if countries decided to increase the use of direct taxation to gain
trading advantages; but such a move appears unlikely since it could trigger a trade
war, something that most countries are hoping to avoid.
96 TREBILCOCK & GIRl, supra note 91, at 60-61.
97 See discussion infra Part III.
98 GATS, supra note 67, at art. XVII.
99 Id.
'0o Id. at art. XXVII.
101 JACKSON CASEBOOK, supra note 50, at 886.
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GATS, the United States proposed to adopt a general and binding
national treatment obligation for all services. This proposal did not
prevail, leading to the current schedule-based obligation system, in
which the U.S. schedules are the most extensive. In practice, foreign
service providers are usually taxed in the United States similarly to
their U.S. competitors because they typically operate a U.S. trade or
business (or maintain a "permanent establishment" in the context of a
bilateral tax treaty). Some specific differences in treatment are
protected by the schedule of specific commitments.
Article XIV of GATS parallels Article XX of GATT, providing
for certain circumstances that justify discrimination for the sake of, or
• 102
in order to balance, free trade promotion with competing values.
Unlike Article XX of GATT, Article XIV of GATS includes
reference, in paragraph (e), to "avoidance of double taxation" as one
of these competing values. 1°3 This reference practically exempts
bilateral tax treaties from the national treatment obligation in
GATS. 104 On the procedural level, Article XXII of GATS requires a
bona fide consultation process among member countries regarding
any relevant matter or, alternatively, a consultation with either the
dispute settlement body or the Council for Trade in Services.' 5
Article XXII:3 complements Article XIV(e) by denying the right for
consultation or initiation of a dispute settlement process with respect
to measures covered in a bilateral tax treaty.106 Article XXII:3 further
provides that in case of uncertainty whether a measure falls within the
scope of the bilateral tax treaty, the matter could be brought to the
Council for Trade in Services, which shall refer it to a final and
binding arbitration. Article XXIX:6 of the U.S. bilateral tax treaty
with Canada includes a coordinating rule with Article XXII of
102 GATS, supra note 67, at art. XIV; GATT, supra note 60, at art. XX.
103 GATS, supra note 67, at art. XIV.
104 Article XIV of GATS provides a caveat that these exceptions must not
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries. See
GATS, supra note 67, at art. XIV. This caveat has not been discussed in the United
States to the best of this author's knowledge. The caveat may also be redundant with
respect to GATS Article XIV(e), since its subject must be an international
agreement, which is unlikely to serve as a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination against a bilateral treaty partner. It may be worth noting that
equivalent domestic measures such as the foreign tax credit rules of the United States
are not covered by this exception, but it is hard to think how these could realistically
be attacked as discriminating against foreign service providers.
105 GATS, supra note 67, at art. XXII.
106 Such measures could be contained in a bilateral tax treaty or a similar
international agreement relating to the avoidance of double taxation.
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GATS.10 7 The rule provides that a measure falls within the scope of
the treaty if it relates to a tax to which the nondiscrimination clause of
the bilateral tax treaty (Article XXV) applies.108 A measure is
similarly held to fall within the scope of the treaty if it relates to any
other tax to which another provision of the bilateral tax treaty applies,
but only to the extent of such application.09 The rule further provides
that, notwithstanding Article XXII:3 of GATS, any question
regarding interpretation of the above exception will be dealt with by
the mutual agreement mechanism in the bilateral tax treaty (or any
other procedure agreed upon by the bilateral tax treaty parties) and
not by a final and binding arbitration under the auspices of the
Council for Trade in Services.1 Despite the dominant role of
bilateral tax treaties, there may still be situations not covered by them,
either because of their scope or because of the lack of a bilateral tax
treaty between the United States and the relevant country.!
In conclusion, the national treatment requirements in the realm of
the WTO do not significantly affect direct taxation in the United
States at the present time. Theoretically, these requirements may
apply to discredit a variety of widely acceptable but potentially
discriminatory international and domestic tax norms. Then again, this
scenario is unlikely without a change in the present political
equilibrium. Similar protection from discrimination is provided by
107 Protocol Amending the Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and
Capital, U.S.-Can., art. 17(2), Mar. 17, 1995, 2030 U.N.T.S. 236, 247-48 (amending
Article XXIX:6 of the original 1980 treaty).
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id. This provision is a typical Canadian bilateral tax treaty provision and does
not appear in other U.S. bilateral tax treaties. The Treasury Department's technical
explanation of the Canadian bilateral tax treaty sheds some light on the U.S.
interpretation of Article XXII of GATS. The Treasury seems to view this provision
broadly as a carve-out of direct tax measures, as covered by bilateral tax treaties, from
the national treatment obligation under GATS. See U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY,
TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE CONVENTION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA AND CANADA WITH RESPECT TO TAXES ON INCOME AND CAPITAL, available
at http://www.intltaxlaw.com/TREATIES/CANADA/canada%20tech % 20
explanation.pdf (last visited July 17, 2005). The same applies to nonincome tax
measures covered in the bilateral tax treaty. For a specific reference in a treaty, see
Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, U.S.-Kaz., Oct. 24, 1993, S.
TREATY DOC. No. 104-15 (1996).
i The United States has a significant network of bilateral tax treaties, especially
with developed countries, but is not considered a world leader in this respect. For a
good summary of the current status of U.S. bilateral tax treaties, see the constantly
updated review in Tax Management International Journal.
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bilateral tax treaties. Such protection, however, is less robust than a
potential WTO nondiscrimination protection, and it only partially
covers U.S. international trade.
3. Export Subsidies
Nowhere is the conflict between the international tax and
international trade regimes more apparent than in the area of export
tax subsidies. Theoretically, direct government spending could be
designed as a tax expenditure and vice versa."2  A direct export
subsidy may, therefore, be designed as a tax export subsidy instead.
Subsidizing through the income tax system is theoretically the same as
doing so through any other method of taxation. In reality, however,
income tax export subsidies are difficult to effectively implement, and
thus are not commonly used.113 Those that are more likely to be used
114
are generally prohibited by WTO law.
The WTO definition of a "subsidy" is found in the Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement or SCM).115
Pursuant to Article 1, a "subsidy" includes any forgone or uncollected
revenue "that is otherwise due."' 16 Not all subsidies, however, are
• • 117
prohibited; only those that are contingent in law or in fact upon
export performance or discriminatory importation are prohibited.
Direct tax preferences to exporters naturally belong to this group.
Furthermore, the SCM Agreement incorporates a specific "illustrative
list" of measures into the definition of prohibited subsidies, including
112 See David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending
Programs (U. Chi. Olin Program L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 194, 2003), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=442063 (last visited June 9, 2005).
113 In the same way, it is difficult to replace tariffs with income tax measures. See
Joel B. Slemrod, Free Trade Taxation and Protectionist Taxation, 2 INT'L TAX PUB.
FIN. 471 (1995).
114 Countries generally do not use disguised export income tax subsidies.
... The SCM rules were originally in GATT, but were separated from it into the
SCM Agreement in the Tokyo Round.
116 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, art.
1.1(a)(1)(ii), Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1A, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTS 264 (1994), available at http://docsonline.wto.org
[hereinafter SCM Agreement].
117 This group of subsidies is subject to an expedited action procedure through
the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. Other subsidies may also be "actionable" if they
adversely affect the interests of another WTO member, but these are not subject to
the expedited dispute settlement process. Still other subsidies are not actionable.
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some tax-related measures, such as "the full or partial exemption,
remission, or deferral specifically related to exports, of direct taxes.
' 118
This item is explained in a reference footnote 59, which provides that:
(1) if appropriate interest is collected on deferred revenue, the
deferral does not constitute an export subsidy; (2) the arm's length
standard must be included in the analysis, i.e., deviation from this
standard may indicate a subsidy; and (3) measures to avoid double
taxation of foreign sourced income are exempt from subsidy
scrutiny.119 This footnote and the illustrative measures list were at the
center of the Domestic International Sales Corporation (DISC),
Foreign Sales Corporation (FSC) and ETI saga, which is the primary
and most developed dispute relevant to international trade and
taxation in general, and the U.S. export subsidies aspects in particular.
These cases were all about de jure export contingency. De facto
export contingency of a direct tax subsidy would be hard to find using
the current jurisprudence because it requires the application of a
consequential test. Transfer pricing and multinational enterprise
(MNE) taxation pose the biggest challenge to the current regime. In
that context it is extremely difficult to identify and measure exports.
The questions one must ask in this context illustrate this difficulty.
First, whose income is identified and measured? One may simply
answer: any taxpayer. But who is a country X taxpayer? There is no
easy answer to this question. Countries vary in their definitions of
residency (and nonresident taxpayers for that matter) for tax
purposes. Bilateral tax treaties provide a satisfactory tie-breaking
mechanism in the case of individuals but not for business entities."'
Second, the current transfer pricing rules are fairly converged
worldwide, based on the arm's length principle. Does this mean that
one cannot plan ahead and leave a very small profit for tax purposes
in the home country, parking the rest of it in a low-tax jurisdiction, or
just another jurisdiction? Of course not; it is extremely naive to
assume that these rules are as effective as they are intended to be. So,
here we have tax that was otherwise due, and is saved only if
exportation occurs. Nominally, deferral and the current transfer
pricing regime could be considered de facto subsidies contingent on
export. Add services and investments to the mix, and you have a very
dicey situation.
118 SCM Agreement, supra note 116, at Annex I, item (e).
119 Id. at n.59.
120 See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture: Taxing
International Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory
Policies, 54 TAX L. REV. 261, 320 (2001).
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Finally, it will be difficult for WTO members to agree whether
one should test the overall tax burden of taxpayers, or conform to
economical or geographic isolation. In other words, the question is
whether to deviate from the generally accepted fiction in the tax world
that respects legal persons as "separate" taxpayers for these purposes.
A territorial test would encourage conferring of benefits that do not
necessarily appear as tax due and may shift protectionist pressures to
the less WTO-regulated investment. An overall test may catch simple
concessions or international division of income, which are very
common in the tax world.
121
The U.S. foreign tax credit (FTC) regime is also suspect in this
regard. It is suspect because it allows "averaging" of income within
the various foreign source income categories employed by the Code
for the purposes of FTC limitations under Code section 904(d), known
as "baskets."' 22 Basically, a domestic corporation earning high-taxed
foreign source income (related to exports) can reduce its overall
effective tax rate by earning other unrelated, low-taxed income. This
opportunity is further enhanced by source rules particularly favorableS 123
to exporters.
121 Another possibly relevant transfer pricing rule is contained in the U.S. cost-
sharing regulations that allow U.S. corporations to adjust ownership ratios between
themselves and a related foreign entity based on original costs rather than fair market
value. If sale of goods is involved, the effect would likely be to make exports cheaper.
The classic case is when a technology corporation establishes an offshore subsidiary,
financed by a simple contribution from the U.S. parent. The subsidiary co-finances a
project with the parent (let's say 50/50), with the prospect that it will sell the products
anywhere in the world except for the United States, where the parent holds the selling
rights. Now assume that the project is successful and the reality is that the non-U.S.
market comprises 60 percent rather than the projected 50 percent of the market. In
compliance with the technical requirements of the regulations, the group can adjust to
this new reality on the basis of the original (low) costs of development, rather than
having to transfer ownership rights (10 percent) at the current (high) price, or
resorting to active (expensive) export. The supposedly retrospective construction of
the regulations may provide a defense, namely providing for adjustments rather than
actual exports; the central principle of the regulations is that no export is involved.
Note that the U.S. regulations are not coordinated with other countries, and that in
this context they cannot be considered a measure to avoid double taxation. Finally,
regarding transfer pricing in general, it is possible to argue that it represents a
measure to avoid double taxation; thus, if it arises from an international agreement, it
is out of the scope of the SCM Agreement, pursuant to the Agreement's Illustrative
List of Export Subsidies in Annex I, item (e), and the related footnote 59.
122 I.R.C. § 904(d). Note that the American Jobs Creation Act has finally
reduced the number of baskets to two. See American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub.
L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418.
1 Such as section 863(b), which allows a manufacturer that sells its products
280
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The analysis of de facto export contingency may be overly
hypothetical to some at this early stage of the discourse. Nevertheless,
such analysis is relevant with respect to the interpretation of the
double tax avoidance measures mentioned in paragraph (e) of GATT
Article XX and footnote 59 of the SCM Agreement. As mentioned
above, the United States based one of its arguments in the
DISC/FSC/ETI case on the fifth sentence of footnote 59, which
exempts measures designed to avoid double taxation of foreign-source
income from being an export subsidy within the meaning of SCM
Article 3.1(a). The argument interprets the footnote as providing
general immunity for measures aimed at avoiding double taxation,S 124
however defined domestically. ETI was argued to be such a
measure. as it exempts certain foreign source income from U.S.
taxation, which is an accepted method of double tax relief. The AB
rejected"5 these arguments as it viewed some of the income exempted
under ETI as not having a sufficient link to a foreign state. As a
result, the AB was not convinced that ETI exempts "only" foreign
source income. This is a question of how one understands the
"source" concept, which could mean different things with respect to
different types of income (as is often 'the case with tax terminology,
abroad (i.e., exporter) to use an arbitrary rule which allocates 50 percent of its export
profits outside of the United States as foreign source income. Purchased (rather than
manufactured) inventory is sourced under another arbitrary rule: the "title-passage"
rule, pursuant to Code section 861(a)(6) and Treasury Regulations section 1.861-7(c),
which allow sellers of U.S. inventory abroad (i.e., exporters) to determine at will
whether their income generated in such transactions will be domestic or foreign
source income. This rule allows exporting taxpayers to choose the better tax
treatment, so rationally there must be a tax forgone by the Treasury, but it is
essentially an arbitrary rule with no economic rationale, which makes its comparison
with any "baseline" arbitrary as well. Similarly, the royalties source rule, pursuant to
section 861(a)(4), provides that the place of use of the intellectual property will
determine the source of the income (royalties) it generates. Once combined with the
rule that sources research and development expenses (allowing a deduction of half of
these expenses according to the location of R&D activities and half according to the
location of the sales activities), this rule must also amount to an effective de facto
subsidy. None of the above provisions are regularly thought of, or serve, as measures
to avoid double taxation. For a review of the effect of the U.S. FTC rules on export,
see Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines, Jr., The Uneasy Marriage of Export Incentives
and the Income Tax (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8009,
2000), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8009 (last visited Apr. 27, 2005). Of
course, the FTC rules may be out of the scope of the SCM Agreement as measures to
avoid double taxation, if found in a bilateral tax treaty.
124 It also defines these measures and provides the definition of foreign source
income. See AB Report, supra note 1, 36.
125 See id. 1 165,184.
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one can seldom rely on the plain meaning of a word as its definition
can vary from one context to the next).
126
Note, finally, that the United States is promoting a more equal
treatment of direct and indirect taxation in a future WTO, especially
in the context of export subsidies. The current law of export subsidies
treats direct and indirect taxation differently, making it more likely for
a direct tax measure to be found a prohibited export subsidy than an
127
equivalent indirect tax measure.
III. WHAT IS AT STAKE? THE POTENTIAL SCOPE OF TRADE AND
TAX CLASHES: THE U.S. PERSPECTIVE
Limited disputes and general satisfaction with the current status
quo led to the present underdeveloped doctrine of trade law as
applied to tax measures. There is no escape from the conclusion that
countries had not been concerned about the practice of protectionism
through direct tax measures and therefore had not bothered with
bringing direct tax issues to the table of trade negotiations. They were
politically satisfied with the status quo of practical nonapplication of
WTO law to direct tax measures.
This state of affairs is likely to change, however, as a result of
several developments, including the FSC decision. Probably more
significantly, the international tax regime faces certain new challenges
that will require its material modification anyway. Prior to the
discussion of the possible outcomes of such changes and the
presentation of possible solutions to the present incoherence between
the two constructs, it would be useful to map the potential battlefield
in order to understand what is at stake. This Part of the article
attempts to do that from the perspective of the United States. Even
so, it is likely that many of the mentioned tax rules are also used in
many other countries.
As already mentioned, this article follows the traditional
126 One important point not developed in this article is the difference between
the concept of source as it has evolved in the current international tax regime and the
way it is viewed by the AB in the ETI report, equalizing it to the concept of origin,
which in many cases is exactly the opposite from source as we know it in the tax world
- another professional failure of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body resulting from
its lack of expertise in the field. The origin principle just determines the tax rate to be
applied, but not the division of the revenue between the competing jurisdictions,
which is exactly the role of the source rules.
127 Negotiating Group on Rules, United States - Subsidies Disciplines
Requiring Clarification and Improvement, TN/RL/W/78 (Mar. 19, 2003).
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approach used in the scarcely available relevant literature, focusing on
the three sets of WTO rules that might be violated by direct tax
measures: the MFN clause, the national treatment clause, and the
subsidies rules. In addition, it may be useful to think about three
different flavors of direct tax rules: administrative (including anti-
avoidance) rules, direct tax rules that are generally accepted
worldwide in a form similar to that of the United States, and rules that
are unique to the United States.
A. MFN
The most visible potential violation of a general (hypothetical)
MFN obligation is different withholding tax rates for the various types
of income covered by tax treaties. Every country that is party to a
bilateral tax treaty commits this violation. Some treaties even exempt
certain items from taxation if earned by residents of the country that
128is party to the treaty, while other equivalent treaties do not do so.
Additionally, some tax treaty provisions use certain thresholds, both
substantive and quantitative, that must be passed in order to ensure
beneficial tax treatment for certain types of income. The tax treaties
of many countries typically use different thresholds for different treaty
partners." 9 The classic example is the taxation of dividend income.
The 2001 U.S.-Luxembourg treaty, for example, provides for a five
percent withholding tax (similarly to the OECD model), and the
128 Similarly, some treaties provide for withholding of taxes on capital gains, see,
e.g., Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, U.S.-P.R.C., art. 12, Apr. 30,
1984-May 10, 1986, T.I.A.S. No. 12065, at 13, and some do not allow it. In the United
States this case is less important since the United States does not withhold on capital
gains. This is mainly an investment issue, but an expansive reading of other trade
agreements may lead to the understanding that some of the effects prohibited in
GATT and GATS, for instance, could be very similarly achieved through an
investment scheme.
129 One good example is the definition of a permanent establishment (PE), which
varies between countries and therefore identical facts can trigger full domestic
taxation of U.S.-related business income for residents of one treaty partner and no
domestic taxation of such income for residents of another country. The most visible
example is the minimal period that is required for a construction project to trigger a
PE. This period is 12 months in the OECD model tax treaty, OECD MODEL TAX
TREATY, supra note 51, art. 5(3), the U.S. model tax treaty, U.S. MODEL TAX
TREATY, supra note 52, art. 5, and the 2001 U.K. bilateral tax treaty, Convention for
the Avoidance of Double Taxation, U.S.-U.K., art. 5, July 24, 2001, S. TREATY DOC.
No. 107-19 (2002). This period is, however, 183 days out of any 12 months in the 1999
Venezuelan bilateral tax treaty, Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation,
U.S.-Venez., art. 5, Jan. 25, 1999, S. TREATY Doc. No. 106-3 (1999).
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threshold is set at ten percent of the voting stock of a U.S.
subsidiary. 30 The 2001 U.S.-U.K. treaty includes the same rule, yet it
adds a more beneficial provision that exempts, inter alia, dividends
paid by a U.S. corporation to its U.K. parent company if the parent
holds at least eighty percent of the subsidiary's voting power.
Additionally, there may be a difference between voting power and
percentage of voting stock. Other treaties do not include these rules.
The treaty with Luxembourg's neighbor, Belgium, for instance, sets a
single reduced withholding rate for dividends at fifteen percent.1
31
A more subtle example of differential treaty treatment of similar
income is the "other income"' 3 2 clause that appears only in some of
the U.S. bilateral tax treaties.13   This means, for example, that
incidental U.S. income of an Israeli resident will not benefit from
treaty protection and is likely to be fully taxed in the United States,
whereas an Indian resident under the same circumstances will be fully
exempt from U.S. tax on the same income, simply due to the "other
income" clause included in the 1989 U.S.-India bilateral tax treaty.134
In short, U.S. bilateral tax treaties reflect no obligation of the
130 Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Apr. 3, 1996, U.S.-Lux.,
art. 10, S. TREATY Doc. No. 104-33 (1996).
131 Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, July 9, 1970, U.S.-Belg.,
art. 10, 23 U.S.T. 2687 (1970).
132 Following the OECD model tax treaty, other income is taxed only in the
resident country. If such a provision is missing from a treaty, both the residence and
the source country may tax it, or the source country gets the first bite, and the
resident country provides a foreign tax credit for such a bite. See the 1975 bilateral
tax treaty with Israel, which lacks such a provision, Convention with Respect to Taxes
on Income, U.S.-Isr., Nov. 20, 1975-May 30, 1980, Hein's No. KAV 971.
133 An interesting relevant case is the applicability of the U.S. bilateral tax
treaties to limited liability companies (LLCs), which are a relatively new form of
business entity in the United States. Some countries, most notably Canada, refused to
apply the treaty with the United States (which predated the LLC laws) to such
entities, but would accept very similar entities in other countries into the scope of the
relevant bilateral tax treaties. This is a case of a basic MFN violation that is perfectly
acceptable in the bilateral tax treaty world. In the context of GATS, Canada is
probably not protected by the treaty-related limitations since it is its own argument
that this matter is not covered by a bilateral tax treaty, and therefore may be
challenged by the United States in the context of non-Article II exempted sector. A
similar argument under GATT is harder and less probable, but not theoretically
impossible. This case also raises the issue of time passage and the slow updating of
treaties. Necessarily, an updated bilateral tax treaty will provide for different
treatment than older ones.
134 Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Sept. 12, 1989, U.S.-India,
art. 23, S. TREATY Doc. No. 101-5 (1989).
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United States to afford uniform treatment to all treaty partners. 13 5 A
similar lack of the uniform treatment obligation is evident in domestic
tax legislation that allows certain benefits to income tax treaty
partners but not to others, sometimes even distinguishing between
treaty partners. For instance, the new U.S. dividend tax regime
permits the benefit of a tax reduction in the cross-border context, but
conditions extension of the benefit on the distributing corporation's
eligibility to enjoy the benefits of a comprehensive bilateral tax treaty
with the United States (i.e., one that includes an exchange of
information program).
116
This provision seems to create two classes of bilateral tax treaties.
It is expected, however, that most U.S. bilateral tax treaties will be
treated as comprehensive."' Any differential treatment will have a
significant effect on the trade in goods and services.
B. National Treatment
This Part elaborates on the provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code that may be considered potential violations of the U.S. national
treatment obligation, if applied to direct taxation. 13  Some of these
provisions are ubiquitous and are expected to be found in most
income tax systems. The universal nature of these provisions suggests
that they would be difficult to repeal, despite the presence of a trade
law violation. These provisions include 139 the standard deduction,
which is not available to nonresidents pursuant to section
63(c)(6)(B); 140 the thin capitalization provisions of section 1630(), T4
which do not apply to residents;142 the consolidation regime, which
excludes foreign corporations pursuant to section 1504(b), and applies
to any other Code provision referring to the section 1504(b) definition
of "includable corporation," such as the old dividend received
135 This is obviously true with regards to nontreaty countries as well.
136 American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat 1418.
137 Indeed, see I.R.S. Notice 2003-69, 2003-42 I.R.B. 851, which lists all U.S.
bilateral treaties that are considered comprehensive.
138 This does not mean that these provisions are not otherwise justified, or that it
is the opinion of this author that they are such violations. See also Warren, supra note
15, at 151 n.92. For further discussion of potential subsidies, see also infra Part V.
139 Note that this is an illustrative and by no means exhaustive list.
140 I.R.C. § 63(c)(6)(B).
141 I.R.C. § 1636).
142 See Green, supra note 30, at 135.
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deduction regime (with the exception of section 243(e)); 4 1 the transfer
pricing rules that apply solely to cross-border situations (although it is
not clear that they are more burdensome to foreigners);' 44 and finally,
the branch profit tax and excess interest rules that apply only toforeigners. 146
The taxation of technology transfers is an interesting case in this
context. Cross-border intellectual property transactions represent an
underdeveloped area of international economic relations in the WTO.
Nonetheless, the relevant WTO agreement - the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 147 -
provides, in Article 3, for a national treatment obligation. Article 3
provides such treatment "with regard to the protection of intellectual
property," adding in footnote 3 that "protection" "shall include
matters affecting the availability, acquisition, scope, maintenance and
enforcement of intellectual property rights., 148 Thus, theoretically it is
possible that discriminatory taxation of intellectual property (IP) is
prohibited by this provision.
In general, the United States withholds thirty percent of the gross
royalties paid to foreigners. The rate is significantly reduced if a
bilateral tax treaty applies. Assuming, however, that most royalties
are paid to residents of treaty partners, it is disturbing to imagine a
143 I.R.C. § 1504(b).
144 I.R.C. § 482 and the regulations. See in particular the examples in the
regulations, e.g., Treas. Reg. 1.482-1(d)(3)(ii)(C). An interesting point raised by
Professor Green is that enforcement-based discrimination, an accusation raised
against the United States in the context of transfer pricing, may have an effect similar
to a substantive de facto discrimination, but may be hard to manage with a legalistic
approach. Green, supra note 30, at 122. Of course, this may be true regarding other
provisions, such as withholding taxes, foreigners' information reporting and thin
capitalization.
145 I.R.C. § 884. This was conceded as a discriminatory treaty override. Green,
supra note 30, at 102 n.127.
146 I.R.C. § 884(f).
147 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
1C, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTS 365 (1994), 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197
(1994) [hereinafter TRIPS]. Note that the United States has consistently advocated
stronger intellectual property (IP) rights and enforcement in the trading community.
The TRIPS agreement followed several IP conventions that have failed to
satisfactorily settle the issue. The national treatment provision in TRIPS is not new; it
was included in other IP conventions, including primarily the Berne Convention,
which the United States joined only recently.
148 TRIPS, art. 3 n.3.
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claim that this treatment is discriminatory under the "no less
favorable" standard for national treatment violation, in light of the
worldwide acceptability of this method of taxing foreigners. Another
relevant provision is Code section 881(a)(4), which taxes gains from
the sale or exchange of certain IP in a manner similar to royalties. 49
This tax is contingent on the productivity, use, or disposition of such
IP to foreign corporations, as long as these gains are not effectively
connected with a U.S. trade or business.5 In the purely domestic
context, such gains may be taxed at a lower rate of fifteen percent,
which increases the chance of a discrimination claim in a nontreaty
situation, where a thirty percent tax on the gross amount would apply.
Unless used in the context of tax havens, which are more likely to be
susceptible to WTO scrutiny based on direct tax measures, this claim
would be problematic.'
Other rules that could be suspected of national treatment
violation may nevertheless be necessary for the effective operation of
the income tax system in a global business and investment
environment. They may be considered discriminatory simply because
it is more difficult, at times, to collect from foreigners, especially when
asymmetric information risks are prevalent. Section 1446, requiring
partnerships to only withhold taxes from foreign partners, and the
different reporting requirements for foreigners under sections 6038(c)
and 6038A, are just two examples of these rules, even though it is not
clear that the reporting requirements for foreign companies under
sections 6038(c) and 6038A are necessarily more burdensome than the
reporting requirements for domestic corporations."'
As mentioned, there are other rules that are somewhat unique to
the United States, such as section 367, which denies certain system-
wide tax deferral benefits when property leaves the country.5 3  In
particular, section 367(e) denies deferral benefits to distributions in
spin-off transactions and other section 355 situations, and in
liquidations to foreign parent corporations.154  Another such rule
149 I.R.C. § 881(a)(4).
150 An equivalent provision would do the same for individuals.
151 See Slemrod & Avi-Yonah, supra note 26, at 542-44.
152 I.R.C. § 1446; I.R.C. §§ 6038(c), 6038A. Unless an obviously more
burdensome rule applies to foreigners, it is inherently difficult to determine
discrimination on this basis. For instance, it is understandable that foreigners may
find it more burdensome to report in English (in comparison to their U.S.
competitors). It is hard to justify, however, that this amounts to discrimination.
153 I.R.C. § 367.
15 I.R.C. § 367(e).
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requires payment for deduction of original issue discount on a debt
instrument held by a foreign related person pursuant to section
163(e)(3).155 Section 911 provides a tax exemption, under certain
circumstances, to a capped amount of wages earned by U.S.S 156
expatriates. Finally, a nonresident cannot be a shareholder in an S-
corporation under section 1361(b)(1)(C)."'
C. Subsidies
The subsidies category presents actual and current violations of
WTO law. The obvious example is the DISC/FSC/ETI case, where
the U.S. export tax subsidy regimes of the last three decades were
ruled by the WTO to be prohibited subsidies. Those three regimes
are not the only violations in the subsidies category. Other
candidates, while not in obvious violation of the present WTO legal
scheme, may be found on the annual notification of the list of
subsidies, required to be provided by countries to the Committee on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures pursuant to Article 25 of the
SCM Agreement, and Article XVI:1 of GATT.158 The United States
has traditionally issued extensive lists to demonstrate its support of
increased transparency in the WTO. The recent U.S. subsidies list
includes ample direct tax concessions to the agricultural,159 energy, 16°
155 I.R.C. § 163(e)(3).
156 I.R.C. § 911.
157 I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(C).
158 The most recent notification was for the fiscal year 2002 (October 1, 2001-
September 30, 2002), dated October 29, 2003. See Committee on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures, New and Full Notification Pursuant to Article XVI:I of the
GATT 1994 and Article 25 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures, G/SCM/N/95/USA (Oct. 31, 2003), available at http://docsonline.wto.org.
159 Solo farmers are allowed to currently deduct, with some limitations, certain
expenses used to enrich farmland even though the benefit is beyond the current fiscal
year. Id. at 11. Farmers are allowed to expense multi-period livestock and crop
production costs under Code section 263A. Id. at 12. Farmers are forgiven tax
liability on certain forgiven debt, pursuant to Code sections 108 and 1017. Id. at 13.
Certain ordinary agricultural income can get capital gains treatment, pursuant to
Code section 1231. Id. at 13-14.
160 Subject to some limitations, exploration and development costs for oil, gas,
and other fuels may be expensed, pursuant to Code sections 57(2), 263(c), 291, 616,
617 and 1254. Id. at 24-25. Independent fuel mineral producers and royalty owners
are allowed to take percentage depletion deductions rather than cost depletion for oil,
gas, and other fuels, pursuant to Code sections 291, 611-613 and 613A. Id. at 25-26.
Qualifying producers and royalty owners are granted a fixed tax credit per barrel of
alternative fuels, phased out according to market price, pursuant to Code section 29.
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lumber and timber,"' medical,' 62 metals, minerals, and nonfuel
16' 164
extraction industries, as well as to certain geographical zones,'
including a series of concessions to the New York Liberty zone
surrounding the World Trade Center in New York City. 6  An even
longer list of potential subsidies at the subfederal level is also attached
to the notification, and includes direct tax concessions at almost every
state and local jurisdiction, as long as such taxes are still in use. All of
the above are subsidies, but none are de jure contingent on export.
Alternatively, passing the de facto export contingency test or pursuing
the actionable subsidies route may be more difficult. An in-depth
factual inquiry always appears to be necessary whenever a question
arises about a subsidy being subject to the latter test.'66
Id. at 26-27. Individuals can get capital gains treatment for sales of coal under royalty
contracts, pursuant to Code sections 631 and 1231. Id. at 27-28. Petroleum producers
and royalty holders are granted an enhanced oil recovery credit in the United States,
pursuant to Code section 43. Id. at 28. Nonutility taxpayers are granted a special tax
credit for investing in solar and geothermal energy facilities, pursuant to Code
sections 46 and 48. Id. at 29. Qualifying producers and blenders of fuels containing
alcohol are granted a special tax credit, pursuant to Code sections 38 and 40. Id. at
29-30. Producers of electricity from wind, biomass and poultry waste are granted a
special tax credit, pursuant to Code section 45. Id. at 31.
161 Certain ordinary timber income may be treated as capital gains, pursuant to
Code sections 631 and 1231. Id. at 37. Timber owners may expense multi-period
timber growing costs (the benefit of which extends beyond the fiscal year), pursuant
to Code sections 162 and 263A(c)(5). Id. at 38. Taxpayers are granted investment
credit and special amortization for reforestation expenses, pursuant to Code sections
48(b) and 194. Id. at 38-39.
162 Qualifying taxpayers are granted a special credit for research and
development of certain drugs for rare diseases or conditions, pursuant to Code section
45(c). Id. at 39-40.
163 Nonfuel mineral extractors are allowed percentage rather than cost depletion
for nonfuel mineral extraction expenditures, pursuant to Code sections 291 and 611-
613. Id. at 41-42. Nonfuel mineral producers and royalty owners are granted the
option of expensing, rather than capitalizing, exploration and development costs for
nonfuel minerals, pursuant to Code sections 56, 263, 263A, 291, 616-617 and 1254. Id.
at 42-43. Taxpayers are granted the option of capital gains treatment for iron ore
sales, pursuant to Code sections 631 and 1231. Id. at 43. Taxpayers are allowed
deductions of mine reclamation and solid waste disposal property closing costs, based
on accrual of liabilities, pursuant to Code section 468. Id. at 44.
16 Certain concessions target the revitalization of distressed areas. The
concessions vary among zones and include a new markets credit, employment tax
credit, special expensing allowances, tax-exempt bonds, and special capital gains
treatment pursuant to Code sections 45D and 1391-1400J. Id. at 50-51, 53-54.
165 The concessions have various sunset periods, and are granted pursuant to
Code section 1400L. Id. at 54-55.
166 In addition to this list, see the discussion of Code provisions that potentially
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D. Conclusion
The amount and scope of tax provisions and fundamental
constructs that are placed at risk under the hypothetical full
application of WTO law may seem devastating to any tax expert. A
repeal or significant amendment of the tax rules due to such
application of trade law could be likened to an earthquake in the tax
world. It is difficult to imagine such a scenario, particularly because
the income tax systems of all major economic powers include similar
or identical provisions.
The stakes would unquestionably be high in this battle between
the international tax and trade regimes, were they to clash. The
increasingly important international tax regime is stable and
accommodating to economic globalization, but this stability has been
achieved over half a century of international tax policy coordination.
It now faces serious new challenges, aside from the conflict with the
international trade regime. The incongruity between these two
regimes presents a real risk of instability to the already sensitive
equilibrium of the international tax regime. Due to fundamental
differences between the two regimes, it would be practically
impossible to reconcile them in the short term, without overhauling
one or both, a dubious and risky strategy. Next, the article elaborates
on some possible tactics to alleviate this tension, and possibly reduce
the incongruity between these two regimes.
IV. SHOULD TAX EXPENDITURES BE SUBJECT TO WTO LAW
ALONE?
One solution model attempts to reconcile the international trade
violate the national treatment obligation, supra Part IV. One area that is not
problematic in the United States is tax sparing, as the United States has never allowed
it in either its tax code or bilateral tax treaties. Article 27 of the SCM Agreement
allows differential treatment of developing country members. SCM Agreement,
supra note 116, art. 27. It normally applies to subsidies granted by developing
member countries themselves, though it may also apply to subsidies of other countries
relating to, for instance, privatization programs in developing countries. Bilateral tax
treaties could also be affected by this provision - especially when tax sparing is
involved (benefiting a bona fide developing country). Since the United States does
not grant tax sparing, it is not relevant to this article. Note that there has been some
criticism in the United States of the lack of bilateral tax treaties with developing
countries as a means of support for these countries. If effective, inclusion of tax
sparing provisions in bilateral tax treaties may be more relevant in the future,
although there are no signs of such developments at present.
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and tax regimes by the adoption of an acceptable "jurisdiction" or
dividing line between these regimes. The term "solution model"
rather than "solution" is used in this context because the basic
premise of possible reconciliation is still being evaluated, and has not
led to any actual known proposals. The basic premise was promoted• 1 6 7
by Professor Paul McDaniel in his recent Tillinghast lecture, as well
168
as by the AB, albeit implicitly, in its recent ETI decision. The
model discussed in this Part is constructed for the purposes of this
article from Professor McDaniel's lecture. He proposed, albeit in the
more limited context of export tax subsidies, to follow logic similar to
that of the domestic device known as the tax expenditures budget
(which is why this article refers to this solution model as the "tax
expenditure solution"). The central idea of this model is to draw a
dividing line between the international tax and trade regimes that
assigns and divides jurisdiction over the contested tax measures. The
so-called "pure" tax measures would not be subject to WTO law,
while everything else (i.e., tax expenditures) would be fully and
exclusively subject to such law. Practically, this means that the tax
expenditure measures would lose the shelter of the international tax
regime and the special carve-outs provided for bilateral tax treaty
measures, such as those in footnote 59 of the SCM Agreement. 16' The
obvious example and primary target of Professor McDaniel's analysis
was the ETI regime. Professor McDaniel viewed the ETI regime as a
clear example of a tax expenditure: a deviation from the accepted U.S.
norm of worldwide taxation of its residents. Professor McDaniel
therefore concluded that the ETI regime amounted to a "subsidy"
that should be subject to WTO jurisdiction and denied the
preferential treatment reserved for "pure" tax measures.
This Part of the article takes Professor McDaniel's approach
beyond its original scope"7 and develops it as a possible model for
complete reconciliation between the international trade and
international tax regimes. The conclusion reached is that such a
solution model is both unsatisfactory and undesirable. The key for
the success of this solution model is our ability to easily identify a
clear dividing line between "pure tax measures," immune from WTO
167 McDaniel, supra note 7.
168 See AB Report, supra note 1.
169 See supra Part III.B.3.
170 This article does not, therefore, criticize the specific point that Professor
McDaniel makes in his lecture. The author agrees with Professor McDaniel's
particular point and results. The dispute is over the methodology and its application
to a problem with scope much larger than originally proposed by Professor McDaniel.
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scrutiny, and tax expenditures. Merely shifting the debate to this
dichotomy is counterproductive if it does not produce clearer and
more desirable results. Professor McDaniel argues that the dividing
line should be each country's "normative" or "baseline" tax system,
which contains, as he concludes, the desirable characteristics. His
argument was made in the context of the FSC cases and the EU attack
on state aid, leading him to the conclusion that the normative tax
structure and free trade principles are not in conflict with each other.
The perceived objectivity, clarity, and simplicity of this solution would
be attractive had they been real.
The tax expenditure solution model is based on several
assumptions. First, it assumes that every country has an easily
identifiable and noncontroversial "normative" income tax system that
could be used as a benchmark for these purposes. Second, it is
assumed that in most cases it will be easy to identify deviations from
the benchmark. Specifically, it must be simple enough for the WTO
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) to be able to identify such deviations
without much controversy. Third, such deviations are assumed to be
included in each country's tax expenditure budget or similar
mechanism. At the very minimum, countries must at least agree to
produce fair tax expenditure budgets, using the "right"
(noncontroversial) benchmark, and consent to the use of such budgets
not only for internal political monitoring purposes, but also for
international trade compliance. Fourth, the model not only assumes
that a benchmark income tax system could be identified for each
country, but that different countries may have different benchmark
systems, and that such disparities between them will not destabilize
the international trade regime internally. Moreover, should these
differences in benchmarks have undesirable effects on other
interactions between the relevant countries, the model assumes that
these negative effects will not be significant enough to pose an
external threat to the stability of the international trade regime (for
example, the countries negatively affected could demand
renegotiations of their other agreements). Fifth, the model assumes
that it is either desirable to strengthen the role of the WTO and the
DSB by explicitly widening their jurisdiction over direct taxes (up to
this point, the WTO has exercised a very limited jurisdiction over
direct taxes, as demonstrated in Part II above), or that WTO members
are clearly in agreement about the boundary constructed by the tax
expenditure solution. This assumption includes an agreement to
subject direct tax matters (expenditures) to the WTO "legalistic"
dispute settlement process. As will be demonstrated in the following
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sections, many of the above assumptions are not entirely realistic.
A. The Tax Expenditure Budget
To refute these assumptions, one must first present the tax
expenditure concept as it is currently used in the domestic budget
process. Professor McDaniel, together with Professor Stanley Surrey,
defined this concept during Surrey's days as the Assistant Secretary of
the U.S. Treasury for Tax Policy.17' The purposes of the U.S. tax
expenditures budget are highlighted in the following legislative
excerpt:
The Congress declares that it is essential - (1) to assure
effective congressional control over the budgetary process;
(2) to provide for the congressional determination each year
of the appropriate level of federal revenues and expenditures;
(3) to provide a system of impoundment control; (4) to
establish national budget priorities; and (5) to provide for the
furnishing of information by the executive branch in a
manner that will assist the Congress in discharging its
duties. 172
Three (at times competing) dimensions affected the evolution of
the U.S. tax expenditures budget and the academic and professional
debate over its interpretation and desirability."' The first and most
obvious is the provision of information about the tax side of the
budget, which promotes government transparency and a more
educated budgetary process, primarily through comparison of
different budget years. This is the least controversial dimension, as it
is difficult to argue that less data is superior to more data in this
respect. This is true so long as the tax estimates are not viewed as
representing figures equivalent to those of actual direct expenditures.
The second dimension attempts to do exactly that - it compares the
dollar amounts of the tax and direct spending programs, with either
the purpose of gaining political capital, or perhaps as a genuine
171 See, e.g., STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES
(1985).
172 Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
344, § 2, 88 Stat. 297, 299.
173 See, e.g., Julie Roin, Truth in Government: Beyond the Tax Expenditure
Budget, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 603 (2003); Daniel N. Shaviro, Rethinking Tax Expenditures
and Fiscal Language (N.Y.U. Law School, Public Law Research Paper No. 72, 2003),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=444281.
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exploration of the desirability of either program. Finally, the third
and purely political dimension (the one which energized Professor
Surrey's efforts in this regard) is the general belief that spending
programs should not be executed through the Internal Revenue Code.
Some have tried to use the tax expenditure budget in the debate
between proponents of large and small government. In reality, both
Democrats and Republicans have exploited both sides of this debate
(sometimes diverting from their traditional stances) while cynically
disguising the fact that shifting a program from one side of the budget
(spending) to another (tax) does not necessarily reduce the size of the
government. 114 Many have criticized the tax expenditure budget on a
conceptual basis - disputing our ability to agree on the baseline
system, or the ability to produce accurate and useful dollar estimates
- while other criticism was simply the result of the cynical and
devious political exploitation of the budget by the various Democratic
or Republican administrations.175
The debate over the desirability of the tax expenditure budget
goes beyond the scope of this article and will not be addressed.
Nevertheless, the criticism of the budget is useful as far as the budget's
application as a model solution for reconciliation of the international
trade and tax regimes. The first dimension of the tax expenditure
budget, transparency and information reporting, is value-neutral in
principle, and has no legal consequences. Therefore it is largely
irrelevant for purposes of this article. The same is true about an
apolitical comparison of direct spending versus tax expenditure
programs. Each of them is not good or bad per se. A tax expenditure
solution could result in some tax measures being subjected to the
WTO scrutiny and held illegal, while others could be immune from
such scrutiny. Adoption of a solution that assigns legal consequences
to the choice between tax expenditures and direct spending will
inevitably corrupt the clarity and supposed objectivity of these
dimensions. The political dimensions of the tax expenditures debate
are therefore irrelevant to our problem. Realistically, it is hardly
conceivable that anyone will support WTO intervention in the
decidedly domestic debate over the desirable size of the U.S.
government.
174 Daniel N. Shaviro, The Bush Administration's Huge Tax Cuts: Steps Towards
Bigger Government? (N.Y.U. Law School, Public Law Research Paper No. 67, 2003),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=444201.
175 See, e.g., Boris I. Bittker, Accounting for Federal "Tax Subsidies" in the
National Budget, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 244 (1969).
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B. The DISCIFSCIETI Cases
As already mentioned, the WTO's single most important
intervention in domestic income tax policy is found in the U.S. export
tax subsidies cases. These cases also triggered Professor McDaniel's
lecture, which provides the basis for the tax expenditure solution
model develcped in this article. This saga comprises three consecutive
and closely related cases, which should be read together for our
purposes. The AB ruled on the most important segment of the trio in
February 2000. The ruling was that the FSC regime constituted a
prohibited subsidy under Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement.17 6
The FSC regime, enacted in 1984, replaced the DISC regime, which
provided indefinite deferral to a portion of the eligible corporations'
export earnings. 177 The DISC provisions were immediately attacked
by the European Commission (EC), and in 1976 were determined to
contradict U.S. obligations under Article XVI:4 of GATT. 178 At the
same time, the United States challenged some of the European
territorial income tax systems. The GATT panel disapproved of these
as well, but in 1981, after a compromise was reached with the United
States, the GATT council approved these tax systems in a decision
that served as a de facto roadmap for the FSC legislation, enacted as
part of the Tax Reform Act of 1984.179
The FSC regime served essentially the same purposes as the DISC
regime, while attempting to adjust itself to the language of the
council's opinion that permitted nontaxation of extraterritorial
income. Still, the FSC regime exempted a portion of a corporation's
export-related foreign source income from U.S. taxation that would
have otherwise been taxed, contrasting with the normal U.S. policy of
worldwide income taxation. The EC waited thirteen years before it
challenged this second regime in November 1997, followed by a July 1,
1998 official request for a dispute settlement panel, based on
violations of SCM Articles 1.1, 3.1(a), and the SCM illustrative list.180
176 See AB Report, supra note 1.
177 I.R.C. §§ 991-997 (as enacted in 1971). The DISC regime was not repealed
outright, but rather curtailed, leaving in place the so-called interest-charge DISCs.
See Robert Feinschreiber & Margaret Kent, Using Formal Agreements to Achieve
DISC Benefits, 33 TAX MGM'T INT'L J. 303, 303 (2004).
178 United States Tax Legislation (DISC), Nov. 2, 1976, GATIT B.I.S.D. (23d
Supp.) at 98, 113 (1977).
179 Tax Legislation, Dec. 7-8, 1981, GATI B.I.S.D. (28th Supp.) at 114 (1982).
180 Annex I to the SCM agreement, available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/
uragreements/scmagreement.pdf.
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The panel issued a final report against the United States on October 8,
1999, finding that the FSC constituted an export subsidy inconsistent
with the SCM Agreement. The U.S. appeal was rejected on February
24, 2000.181 In response, the United States enacted a third regime, the
ETI, which was designed to comply with the panel decision similarly
to the FSC regime.182 Specifically, ETI purported to incorporate the
now-allowed 83 territorial aspects into the U.S. worldwide system of
taxation. The EU promptly responded, arguing that ETI did not
comply with the FSC ruling. A panel was again established and issued
a report against the United States on August 20, 2001.18' The United
States appealed, but its appeal was rejected on all grounds by the AB
on January 14, 2002.186 The United States then conceded this battle,
and Congress's failure to repeal ETI had led to EU retaliation as of
March 1, 2004.87
Perhaps the most important aspect of this final ruling'88 is its firm
support of the logic that each country has a "baseline" normative tax
system that could be established as a benchmark for an inquiry into a
specific measure suspected of functioning as an export subsidy; a
deviation from that benchmark would indicate a subsidy because,
technically, the tax would be "otherwise due."18 9 Moreover, the AB
emphasized the elective character of the ETI regime, ruling that
181 Appellate Body Report, United States - Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales
Corporations", T 179, WT/DS108/AB/R (Feb. 24, 2000).
182 FSC Repeal and Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act of 2000, Pub. L. No.
106-519, 114 Stat. 2423 (2000). For a concise review of the ETI rules, see Ernest R.
Larkins, Extraterritorial Exclusion Replaces FSC Regime: Mirror Rules, Broader
Spectrum, 12 J. INT'L TAX'N 22 (2001).
183 See Appellate Body Report, supra note 181.
184 The United States stated that the ETI was not just a replacement for the FSC
regime, but a real reform of the U.S. tax system to include territorial tax aspects. See
U.S. Opening Statement at WTO Hearings on ETI Act Appeal, WORLDWIDE TAX
DAILY (Dec. 4, 2001) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNI file, elec. cit., 2001 WTD 233-14).
1& See World Trade Organization, United States - Tax Treatment for "Foreign
Sales Corporations" - Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the European
Communities: Report of the Panel, WT/DS108/RW (Aug. 20, 2001), available at
http://www.wto.org/englishi/tratop-e/dispu-e/108-art215_e.pdf.
186 See AB Report, supra note 1.
187 ETI was finally repealed as of January 1, 2005, with some still debated
transition and grandfathering provisions, by the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004,
Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 101, 118 Stat 1418, 1423-24. For retaliation provisions, see
Council Regulation 2193/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 328) 3 (EC).
188 This article will refer to the final AB Report as incorporating all former
actions.
189 AB Report, supra note 1.
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making the ETI election guaranteed that the taxpayer would pay a
smaller amount of tax than the amount "otherwise due" absent such
an election.90
The next subpart of the article elaborates on the weaknesses in
the AB's position, which is similar in its logic to Professor McDaniel's
suggestion. It is also worth noting that the AB's rhetoric regarding
the elective character of the ETI regime ignores the widespread use of
elections in income tax systems and, despite the AB's attempts to
bolster its position with "mathematical" proof, reveals the AB's
incomplete understanding of this area of the law. T9 For instance, the
so-called "check-the-box" election allows a U.S. parent company to
treat some foreign subsidiaries as branches for U.S. tax purposes and
vice versa (treat some of the foreign branches as subsidiaries). Such
an election is likely to have a positive effect on U.S. exporters. True,
it will be difficult to prove direct dependency on export, but it is
unlikely that anyone will imagine ever subjecting this elective regime
to exclusive WTO jurisdiction.
C. The Tax Expenditure Solution is Unsatisfactory
The most problematic part of an argument in support of the tax
expenditure solution is the claim that a benchmark income tax system
is obvious, easily identifiable, and that such a system would be widely
acceptable, at least in principle. Note that it is not Professor
McDaniel - a leading U.S. tax expert - but the WTO's DSB, whose
members typically have no tax expertise, that performs this analysis.
Even in the domestic context, very prominent tax figures, most
famously Professor Boris Bittker, seriously doubted the possibility of
a consensus among the best tax minds. Indeed, even during the
making of the tax expenditure budgets one can see that the Treasury
and the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) publish separate and
different versions of the budget based on different benchmarks. How,
then, can one seriously argue that foreigners with no knowledge of tax
law, especially U.S. international tax law,' 9' would be able to reach
190 Id.
191 For a more elaborate discussion of AB's failure in this context, see infra Part
V.
192 Our income tax systems are all hybrids. They all deviate from the Schanz-
Haig-Simmons economic definition of income, at least by being mostly, but not
completely, based on realization. They also represent a part accretion tax, taxing
income arising from capital, and part consumption tax, exempting (or deferring) such
income. See Daniel N. Shaviro, An Efficiency Analysis of Realization and Recognition
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consensus? The ETI case, which was still attempting to "square the
circle" and follow this flawed logic, serves as a good example of these
difficulties. The heroic attempt to identify a single benchmark system
failed, and the AB had to resort to a more pragmatic "smell test."'1 93
This is not to say that the AB's final conclusion was incorrect.
The United States should have repealed these measures. The
concern, however, is with the poor guidance that these cases provide.
The best explanation given by the AB for adopting this reasoning was
that such analysis allowed it to reach an "objective conclusion., 194
Cynicism aside, this is a very weak justification for cyclical and
unsubstantiated reasoning. Applying a general "smell test" that
practically incorporates both consequential and intent-based tests -
neither of which were adopted by the DSB - may be practical in the
current environment, where few direct tax measures conflict with
WTO law, but such a test does not help us to better understand the
meaning of a tax "otherwise due."' 95
Once one realizes the difficulty of agreeing on a benchmark
system, it is not difficult to understand the potential impossibility of
clearly identifying deviations from such a benchmark. Deviations are
relative by definition 196 and cannot be measured satisfactorily or serve
as reasonable public guidance without a clear consensus on the
benchmark system. Therefore, it is a mistake to infer a general rule
from Professor McDaniel's analysis of the ETI case. For one, this
case was the typical "easy case" - a blunt export subsidy that was
originally designed as such in an explicit compromise with the EC.
Second, the subsidy rules themselves are more precise, which makes
identifying violations of these rules easier than identifying violations
of more subtle discriminatory nature. Inductive reasoning is therefore
inappropriate in this case.
One may argue that using each country's tax expenditures budget
Rules Under the Federal Income Tax, 48 TAX L. REV. 1 (1992). The variety of
international rules just compounds the problem; no well-known tax systems in the
world are entirely territorial, and by the same token, none are really "worldwide."
193 AB Report, supra note 1.
194 Id. 89.
195 Unfortunately, in the specific proceedings, the United States has not
presented an alternative, coherent norm, except for asking the AB for deference to
each country's own system.
196 This is inherent to any such legal definition, and particularly the subsidy
definition as "revenue forgone." "Forgone" necessarily means that the revenue was
"otherwise due," so the latter expression is only repetitive and redundant, and
therefore does not require separate analysis.
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as an indicator of deviations from the benchmark system may be a
simple solution to the problem of identifying such deviations. This is
also the third assumption discussed earlier. It is not, however, a
satisfactory solution. Many countries still do not have tax
expenditures budgets. The countries that have adopted them use
them in very different ways and based on very different assumptions.
Moreover, in countries such as the United States, where the Treasury
Department and JCT publish different budgets, it may be difficult to
decide which one to use. Finally, having in place a rule that uses
countries' tax expenditures budgets to determine WTO jurisdiction
over their direct tax measures may encourage countries to change
their tax expenditure budget guidelines in order to limit the risk of
WTO intervention. This will inevitably be counterproductive. 97
Similar concerns cast doubt on the fourth assumption mentioned
in Part IV.A above. It is reasonable to assume that countries will
differ in the intensity and speed of their reactions to a tax expenditure
solution. Some may even think that the domestic importance of their
tax expenditures budget supersedes the international implications and
thus refuse to change their current system - showing willingness to
fight off the WTO if and when a problematic case comes along. This,
as the United States realized in the ETI case, is not merely a
theoretical scenario. The problem is that once the tax expenditures
solution is adopted, some countries will suffer because they will have
to repeal some of their direct tax measures, or face the prohibition
against adopting new ones. Such countries may seek "compensation,"
or resetting of the agreed-upon balance. This sentiment is now
prevalent in the United States in connection with the U.S. defeat in
the ETI case. 19' Such rebalancing of interests may be undesirable
because it may have a "snowball" effect and trigger reopening of
issues the settlement of which had already been costly. These
"dynamic" effects surely must be taken into account before the tax
expenditure solution is adopted. The magnitude of these effects is
difficult to predict, but it is most likely to be felt in the tax area. It
would be especially problematic if the result is detrimental to the
stability of the current international tax regime. No solution to the
relatively rare disputes arising from income tax protectionism
197 This will also be undesirable, as suggested in the next subpart.
198 Some even argue that the EC brought the FSC cases forward in response to its
defeat in several WTO disputes, primarily the bananas case. See Gary Clyde
Hufbauer, The Case of Mutating Tax Incentives: How Will the DISC/FSC/ETI Drama
End?, WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY (Apr. 8, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNI file, elec.
cit., 2002 WTD 67-5).
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warrants the destabilization of the international tax regime. This is
admittedly a speculative and normative point. The next subpart deals
with the more concrete and empirical aspects of the tax expenditures
solution.
D. The Tax Expenditure Solution is Undesirable
This article is skeptical not only about the ability of the tax
expenditure solution to reconcile the international tax and trade
regimes, but also about the desirability of such a reconciliation. The
uncalculated risk the solution model poses to the stability of the
international tax regime is just one problem.
The most fundamental aspect of the tax expenditure solution is
the identification of the baseline tax system.. The two tax
expenditures budgets (taking into account the separate budgets
prepared by the Treasury and the JCT) used in the United States at
the present time are constantly debated. Regardless of the ongoing
debate, they represent an accepted political and practical income tax
system, rather than a pure or normative economic system. In the
domestic context, the use of the tax expenditures budget is widely
considered useful so long as the budget is not seen as accurately
measuring the various tax expenditures it contains, but simply
reporting useful information to the public. In addition, the budget is
seen as a helpful device to track expenditure trends over time. 99 In
most cases, there is no normative condemnation in characterizing
something as a tax expenditure rather than a direct expenditure. The
distinction, however, makes a big difference when defining a subsidy,
since any deviation from the baseline is a subsidy, and once a subsidy
is dependent on export it is automatically prohibited. °
Adopting the tax expenditure solution will expose the U.S. tax
expenditures budget to the pressures and demands of international
politics, in addition to the pressures it already faces from the domestic
199 See Roin, supra note 173, at 608, 615.
200 Take, for example, the opportunity to defer taxation of certain foreign source
income earned through foreign subsidiaries. This is probably the most "basic"
relevant tax expenditure in the United States. It also includes income that falls into
certain exceptions for active income in the major antideferral regime in the United
States - subpart F of the Code. Under Professor McDaniel's method, it should be
considered a subsidy, but this is one of the most popular tax measures in the United
States, and its being part of the normative "baseline" is just a question of perspective,
whether that coveted baseline is a pure (and nonexistent) worldwide taxation system
without deferral, or a more balanced worldwide tax system, protected by acceptable
anti-avoidance rules.
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political process. The attempt to piggyback on the domestic tax
expenditures budget for identifying international violations of WTO
law will only result in an even more corrupt domestic tax expenditures
budget. Such a result cannot be desirable unless one believes that the
destruction of the tax expenditures budget is a desirable outcome.2°'
Moreover, the very need to piggyback on the tax expenditures budget
signals that the interpretation and application of WTO law to direct
taxation is problematic. Otherwise, one would simply apply the WTO
law without reference to the tax expenditures budget. Again, this
problem is illustrated by the ETI case, when even after the U.S.
acceptance of the logic of turning to the tax expenditures budget 2 2 (in
cases of blunt and conspicuous tax export subsidies), the AB failed to
put this concept to work, resorting to the aforementioned "smell
test., 20 3 It appears that the AB was desperate to cling to something
with a hint of objectivity, so it focused on the tax expenditures budget
as a rhetorical device, without providing any further useful guidance.
All the prior discussion assumes that the country in question
actually employs a tax expenditures budget. Would the adoption of a
tax expenditure solution mean that every WTO country would have to
employ a tax expenditures budget? Such a requirement seems
excessive and may trigger resistance. Moreover, if the information in
the tax expenditures budget is used to arrive at a presumption (even a
refutable one) of the existence of a subsidy, there will inevitably be a
difference in treatment of countries with and without a tax
expenditures budget. Such a difference may affect decisions of
countries with regard to tax expenditures budgets: decisions the main
purpose of which should be the improvement of the domestic
government and budgetary processes, not making the life of the DSB
easier. It is also likely that countries without tax expenditures budgets
have either developing or transitional economies. 204 The construction
of a reliable budget process in such countries is crucial to their
chances of maintaining a stable political regime, which is also in the
interest of the developed world. These efforts are being supported
201 One must note that it is not clear that this will indeed lead to the
disappearance of the tax expenditures budget. Even if one is sympathetic to the
destruction of the budget, it is not clear that this is the most efficient way to do that.
202 See U.S. Opening Statement at WTO Hearings on ETI Act Appeal,
WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY (Dec. 4, 2001) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNI file, elec. cit.,
2001 WTD 233-14) (remarks by Deputy Treasury Secretary Kenneth W. Dam).
203 See supra Part IV.C.
204 OECD countries have all adopted tax expenditure budgets as of the end of
the century.
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and monitored by the World Bank and the IMF despite obvious
difficulties. Tampering with these vital efforts for the purpose of
determining whether something is a subsidy is clearly undesirable. 5
The dynamic elements mentioned above may or may not be
desirable in theory. Nevertheless, they raise some skepticism
regarding the tax expenditures model, since any negotiation of
agreements at the international level involves fragile compromises,
and the risk of frustrating the equilibrium in already settled areas
seems unjustified. This is particularly true due to the present
vulnerable position of the WTO. Despite the recent achievements in
the agricultural subsidies area, the Doha Round is still stalled, and
anti-WTO sentiment is still strong across the political map. The fifth
assumption underlying the tax expenditures model, i.e., that it is
desirable to widen WTO's jurisdiction over income tax measures, is
related to this reality. It seems unlikely that countries will presently
support an expansion of WTO's powers. This is particularly true
when such an expansion gives WTO power over direct taxation, one
of the most cherished symbols of national sovereignty in a world
where sovereignty is becoming increasingly limited. Another aspect
of subjecting direct taxation to the WTO power is the necessity to
accept the WTO dispute settlement process and its "legalistic"
approach, which is undesirable on its own, as explained by Professor
Robert Green in one of the first articles written on this topic.
2 6
Professor Green drew on the significant differences between the trade
and tax regimes - the superior transparency of the latter in particular
- to argue for continuing to use the mutual agreement approach of
the international tax regime in the resolution of tax disputes, in
207contrast to the WTO's "legalistic" approach °.
Finally, since there is no structured support for the tax
expenditure solution other than Professor McDaniel's limited analysis
and the AB's confusing tautology in the ETI case, there appears to be
no structured argument in support of its superiority over other
solutions. Because this area of research is new, little evidence of
alternative arguments is available. The next Part of the article will
discuss this author's coordination solution and demonstrate that it is a
205 This is not to say that WTO law should accommodate IMF and World Bank
programs in all cases. The relationship between these international institutions has
not yet been explored in the literature, but at least one project to this effect is
expected to be published soon (details with the author).
206 See Green, supra note 30.
207 Id. at 139. For a more conceptual exploration of the issues on our agenda,
which actually predated Green's article, see Slemrod, supra note 113.
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feasible and superior alternative to the tax expenditure solution.
V. COORDINATING THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND
INTERNATIONAL TAX REGIMES
As is apparent from the analysis above, this article doubts the
feasibility of reconciling the current international tax and
international trade regimes. Maintaining the current status quo,
208however, is risky, and is not the only available option, since the
policies of these two dynamically evolving international regimes could
be coordinated in a manner that should prevent serious conflicts from
holding back the advancement of these regimes, at least in the short
term. In the long term, a more comprehensive, permanent solution
may be sought, yet such a solution will most likely involve dramatic
restructuring of one or both of the relevant regimes, and is therefore
beyond the scope of this article. Moreover, this article does not
attempt to provide a detailed prescription for such coordination.
Rather, it aims at convincing the reader that coordination is a feasible
solution method for these currently conflicting regimes. The article
does provide some observations that may assist in the design of an
actual solution - the solution that must be designed by governments
in the normal course of negotiations of the relevant regimes.
The FSC saga serves as an important lesson to designers of any
potential solution. First, it demonstrates that income tax
protectionism is not merely theoretical. The argument that the U.S.
export tax subsidies were unique and acceptable in the context of the
compromise between the EU and the United States over DISC and
the European exemption systems can no longer hold after the WTO's
unequivocal decisions against the United States and the EU's firm
insistence on enforcing these decisions. This practical lesson
complements and makes more concrete the theoretical argument
made above, that income tax protectionism is expected in a world that
denies governments the full authority and flexibility over most
economic policy measures.
Another clear lesson from the FSC decisions is that current WTO
law and DSB practice are hardly capable of handling income tax
related cases. Despite some direct references to income tax treaties in
208 The FSC saga is not alone as an income export tax subsidies case. China uses
its income tax extensively for protectionism as well. See, e.g., Daniel Pruzin, U.S.
Questions Array of Chinese Subsidies in Notification Circulated to WTO Members,
WTO REPORTER (Oct. 12, 2004) (WL, BNA-INTLTRADE database, elec. cit.,
10/12/2004 BNA WTOR d12).
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the WTO's primary legal sources, there is no developed doctrine or
jurisprudence that could have assisted the panel and the AB in
deciding these relatively easy cases. Instead, the AB struggled
through unrelated jurisprudence before finally reaching the inevitable
result - but without a firm legal footing, and only supported by
verbiage that amounted to a typical "smell test."20 9
210For example, in its report, when defining a subsidy, the AB
repeats the rhetoric of the FSC case and the decision of the panel in
the ETI case regarding the meaning of "tax otherwise due," stating
that "the mere fact that revenues are not 'due' from a fiscal
perspective does not determine that the revenues are or are not
'otherwise due' within the meaning... of the SCM Agreement., 211
The AB appears desperate to support the result it needed to reach
based on its "legalistic" doctrine, and it comes through despite the
flaws in its reasoning.
Even if we took the quote above seriously, two material
difficulties arise. First, the AB implied that the fiscal doctrine and its
terms of art do not intersect with WTO law. Indeed, WTO law does
not rely on fiscal definitions and concepts, even when the subject
matter is the income tax. This again demonstrates both the
incongruity between the international trade and international tax
regimes, and the inability of the DSB to handle income tax matters.
Second, the AB demonstrates a lack of understanding of the modern
income tax system, which is built from a mesh of norms, some
conflicting and some complementing each other - norms that cannot
be explained by a single grand theory.
Nonetheless, the AB insists on imposing on the parties (the
United States in this case) the assumption that there must be a
defined normative benchmark to which it is possible to compare the
212
measure under review. At most, the existence of such a normative
benchmark is debatable, 213 and the benchmark is unquestionably
difficult to identify, with the AB being the first to acknowledge this
•• 214
difficulty in its decision. Of course the AB wanted to support its
decision with an apparently objective legal source, and the existence
of an easily identifiable normative benchmark would assist it with
209 For the best example for this struggle, see footnote 66 of the AB Report. AB
Report, supra note 1, at 28 n.66.
210 Id. 88.
211 Id.
212 Id. 89.
213 See discussion of the tax expenditures solution, supra Part IV.C.
214 AB Report, supra note 1, $ 90.
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that. Yet in reality the AB ended up building its legal construction
out of thin air, in the process exposing both the insufficiency of the
current WTO law in dealing with tax matters and its own discomfort
and lack of expertise in this area.
The significance of this lack of expertise is the third lesson taken
from the FSC cases. While struggling with the difficult task of forcing
an obvious result into the confines of a shaky doctrinal mold, the
panel and the AB proved their lack of expertise once again. In
addition to the above, note just a few other examples: for one, the
decisions devoted some discussion to the elective aspect of ETI,
concluding that absent such an election there must be a tax "otherwise
due. '  This is nominally true just because of the nature of an
election, but since elections are so frequently used in income tax
systems, they cannot all be viewed as subsidies.216 Familiarity with the
normal design of income tax systems would prevent the panel and the
AB members from elaborating on this irrelevant point; if
protectionism is the concern, then the election point adds nothing but
rhetoric. It is not difficult to see that the ETI election could have
been redesigned as a nonelective provision applicable only to those
benefiting from it, but it would still be a prohibited export subsidy.
Another fundamental concept of income tax law is "source.
2 17
This concept is exclusive to international tax matters and its purpose is
to divide income between jurisdictions that may have overlapping
taxing claims regarding an item of income. Normal international tax
practice designates each item of income as having either a "foreign"
or "domestic" source. The consequence of this designation may be
the grant of some tax relief - but such relief is universally granted
only to foreign source income. Source rules determine which country
(typically called the source country) gets the "first bite" in taxing the
item of income, and such "bite" is typically capped under
international norms. Source rules also determine what competing
jurisdiction (typically called the residence country) gets the residual
right to tax the item of income. Residence country is the country that
grants the tax relief; in doing so, it is likely to take into consideration
the "first bite" allowed to the source country. There are various
source rules that facilitate these determinations with regard to
different types of income (one source rule for business income, one
215 Id. 103-104.
216 The desirability of the use of such elections may be questionable at times but
this is irrelevant to the point made and beyond the scope of this article.
217 Source rules are discussed at more length in REUVEN S. AvI-YONAH, U.S.
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION ch. 2 (2002).
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for dividends, etc.).
The AB ignores the role of source rules without discussion,
resorting to the dictionary observation that "in ordinary usage, the
word 'source' can refer to the place where a thing originates, and that
the words 'source' and 'origin' can be synonyms.""21 Note that while
"origin" is an important concept of indirect taxes, it is meaningless in
the realm of income taxes. Immediately after this light and somewhat
hesitant linguistic discussion, the AB oddly proceeds to make a
conclusion that "the word 'source,' in the context of the fifth sentence
of footnote 59, has meaning akin to 'origin' and refers to the place
where the income is earned."219 Again, cynicism aside, this conclusion
is both potentially self-contradictory and plainly wrong. It is
potentially self-contradictory because origin and the place where
income is earned are not necessarily the same. For example, the
origin of income from the sale of a manufactured good could be the
place of manufacture, whereas the income could be earned elsewhere
- such as in the country where the property rights reside. The
conclusion is also wrong because source is neither of the above. In the
immediately preceding example for instance, the source of income
could be in a third country where the ultimate purchaser resides.220
The discussion of source came up in the context of footnote 59,
which exempts measures to avoid the double taxation of foreign
source income."' The concept of double taxation has been historically
important in the realm of income taxes, yet it does not have a strong
normative significance. Its acceptable meaning serves as a useful
starting position on which countries base their income division norms
and, in most cases, their agreements to relieve excessive taxation that
may hinder cross-border transactions. Moreover, it is now understood
that under-taxation, likewise, affects international transactions and
• rr • • 222
may create similar inefficiencies. The difficulty of using the concept
of double taxation and its incomprehensiveness are not the fault of the
AB. In fact, the concept illuminates the flaw in the reference to it in
footnote 59 - another indication of the incongruity between the
international tax and international trade regimes. The AB is at fault,
218 AB Report, supra note 1, 137.
219 Id.
220 See Treas. Reg. § 1.861-7(c) (1960).
221 The AB complicated its analysis by elaborating on this measure, using clearly
unrelated tax concepts and examples. The criticism of the language of the whole
decision is, however, beyond the scope of this article, and the examples explained are
not meant to be comprehensive - they are illustrative only.
222 See Lang, supra note 37, at 81-88.
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however, because it applied the concept mechanically without
reference to the underlying principles that guide international tax
norms today.223
These lessons support Professor Green's point about the
undesirability of subjecting the international tax regime to the
"legalistic" approach of the WTO and the DSB, and the FSC
decisions further prove his point. Therefore, any attempt to reconcile
the international tax regime with the international trade regime (such
as the conceptual solution model constructed in Part IV) in a manner
that will require subjecting income tax measures to exclusive DSB
scrutiny is undesirable.
Nonetheless, it is understood that there is no complete escape
from WTO law and jurisprudence; the international tax regime cannot
evolve to permit and serve as a safe haven to blunt violations of
undisputable obligations of WTO members. This article argues that
the only way to reconcile this difficulty is to require coordination of
these two international regimes. The international tax regime's
nonlegalistic dispute resolution mechanisms can accommodate this at
the present time; it is much more difficult the other way around due to
the formalities to which the court-like the WTO DSB must adhere.
Primary assignment of such disputes to the international tax regime is
therefore more workable.
Another recent development provides some complementary
lessons. Although anecdotal and admittedly driven by different
motivations, the struggle between various domestic direct tax systems
of the EU member states and the European Court of Justice (ECJ)
can serve as a warning to proponents of solutions that attempt to
subject income taxes to WTO law, or, as a matter of fact, to any other
supranational law that is not designed with specific attention to
income tax policy. In short, the EU member states specifically agreed
to leave income taxation out of the scope of the harmonizing union.
224Only a few measures have been harmonized since, and even these
measures were practically left for the member states to implement at
223 Admittedly, many tax experts constantly refer to double taxation as if it were
a plain-meaning doctrinal term. Even income tax treaties are still commonly called
double tax treaties. Therefore, this is probably a less problematic example of the
insufficiency of the AB analysis.
224 Most famous examples are the parent-subsidiary and merger directives. For
the official summary of the current state of affairs, see European Union, Direct
Taxation: Introduction, available at http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/126036.htm
(last visited June 9, 2005).
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their own pace.125 An attempt to harmonize corporate taxation in
226Europe, for example, stumbled despite strong institutional support.
The resistance of the member states' governments is understandable if
one considers the scope of current limitations on these governments'
economic policies. Their monetary policies are, in most cases, subject
to the European Monetary Union (EMU). Fiscal policies (deficit size
27in particular) are restricted by the Stability and Growth Pact.
228Indirect taxes (primarily VAT in Europe) are being harmonized,
and the social security and spending programs are under immense
pressures. The income tax is left as one of the few measures that
governments can use relatively freely to implement their economic
policies. Even that measure, however, is heavily constrained by
economic globalization. 29
The ECJ stepped into this reality and has recently attempted to
implement a constitution-like approach, mandating the repeal of
certain income tax measures that distinguished between citizens and
other Europeans for income tax purposes. 230 The court's approach has
been based on the so-called European fundamental "freedoms,"
2 31
225 Implementation of the merger directive is one example. See Council
Directive 90/434/EEC art. 12, of 23 July 1990 on the Common System of Taxation
Applicable to Mergers, Divisions, Transfers of Assets and Exchanges of Shares
Concerning Companies of Different Member States, 1990 O.J. (L 225) 1 (EC),
available at http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/126039.htm.
226 For a recent development, see, e.g., Joe Kirwin, Marks & Spencer Case
Demonstrates Need for Common Tax Base in EU, Official Says, BNA INT'L TAX
MONITOR (Feb. 3,2005) (LEXIS, BNA lib., BNAITM file) (citing, on the condition of
anonymity, an EU commission official supporting tax base harmonization, and
evaluating whether it would be better to get there directly through member states'
negotiation, or with the pressure of an ECJ decision to that effect).
227 See Council Resolution 97/C, Amsterdam, 17 June 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 236) 1, 2
(EC), available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/rech-reference-pub.do (last visited
July 18, 2005).
228 See Council Directive 77/388/EEC, Harmonization of the Laws of the
Member States Relating to Turnover Taxes - Common System of Value Added Tax:
Uniform Basis of Assessment, 1977 O.J. (L 145) 1 (EC), available at
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/rech reference-pub.do (last visited July 18, 2005).
229 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition and the Fiscal
Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1575-76 (2000).
230 See, e.g., David B. Oliver, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture: Tax Treaties and
the Market State, 56 TAX L. REV. 587, 593-95 (2003).
231 See, e.g., The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000
O.J. (C 364) 1, available at http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/133501.htm (last
visited July 18, 2005). For the court's jurisprudential attitude, see, e.g., Case C-319/02,
In re Manninen, 2004 E.C.R. 342, 71 (striking down the Finnish imputation system,
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particularly the freedom of establishment. Reading these freedoms
expansively, the court seemed exclusively to reject domestic income
tax measures as interfering with the single market. This is reasonable
in theory; in practice, however, it conflicts with the above-mentioned
inability of European governments to implement national economic
policies. It is not clear how severe the reaction of the member states'
governments will be to this development.
This article does not evaluate the desirability of these
developments in Europe but wishes to emphasize that a country that
agrees to be subjected to general standards (the European so-called
freedoms or, in our case, the general nondiscrimination rules of the
WTO) without explicit caveats must be prepared for its laws to be
diverted in directions not agreed upon, despite explicit agreements
that domestic laws would not be so diverted. The case of the EU is
different from the WTO, which does not attempt to promote a "single
market," yet the dynamics are similar.
Despite the above criticism, this article is not essentially skeptical
of the WTO. On the contrary, it wishes to allow the WTO to focus on
its core mission, rather than dumping on it everything even remotely
related to trade (especially taxation, being a politically sensitive and
technically complex area that is rather well-regulated at the present
time.)
Moreover, keeping the international tax regime out of the
WTO is important for the maintenance of its effectiveness. The
success of the currently separate international tax regime should not
be taken lightly. This is especially true since tax practitioners are
notoriously conservative and unwelcoming to change. Tax, in
addition, is perceived by governments as one of the fundamental
symbols of sovereignty in a time when the force of sovereignty fades
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and transforms from an absolute to a relative notion.
One may argue that Professor McDaniel may still be correct in his
observation that the international tax and international trade regimes
do not necessarily conflict, even if the tax expenditure solution model
is not workable or desirable. It is theoretically possible to deepen the
incongruity between these regimes and formally carve out all income
tax measures from the scope of WTO law and its dispute settlement
process.
which did not extend its benefits to income earned abroad, based on free movement
of capital grounds).
232 For an interesting discussion of the issue by a renowned expert, see SASKIA
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This rule would not solve the problem, but rather would present
countries with carte blanche (and an explicit incentive) to exploit their
income tax systems for protectionist purposes. Such exploitation
would be immune from international scrutiny despite the direct effect
it would have on the flow of international trade. In addition, it would
create problems with using domestic income tax incentives, which
might result in undesirable inefficiencies. Any attempt to refer to
specific products or industries will affect behavior and result in new
inefficiencies. Some international trade-related supervision over the
international tax regime should therefore be maintained. The current
status quo is not sustainable not only because it lacks any guidance,
but also because the current international tax regime will have to
change in the near future. It is not clear whether a new balance could
be achieved in a similar manner to the current balance. The
desirability of such a new balance is also unpredictable.
It is likely and desirable that the international tax regime will
develop in the direction of creating an international tax organization.
Such an organization will serve, at the least, as a global policy forum
with some interpretation authority. The process of increased
international coordination of income tax policies is deterministic: it
must result in an increased, if not a formal, harmonization of
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principles. That is where one can see a possibility of incorporation
of international trade-related standards, such as the already
acceptable nondiscrimination requirement, which is closely related to
the WITO "national treatment" principle. Another obvious provision
that could be incorporated is the prohibition of export tax subsidies.
It is inconceivable that MFN-type provisions could be incorporated
into such a solution in the short term, but one can think of several
similar measures, such as the minimum and maximum rates
provisions, harmonization, setting of a capped range of possibilities,
thresholds, preferred rates - all of which may result in consequences
that de facto approximate the effect of MFN provisions.
Another benefit of this solution is that it is likely to generate a
more cohesive tax regime than an external solution. A solution that
requires WTO-level rules is likely to follow the current division
between trade in goods, services, investment, etc. These separate
agreements are not necessarily coordinated and are currently in
different evolutionary stages, which may render difficult any attempt
of incorporating income tax into these agreements in an effective and
equitable manner.
233 See Brauner, supra note 27.
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Finally, relieving the WTO of the challenge of regulating income
taxes should be welcomed at a time when the organization faces some
serious political challenges in its quest to complete the Doha
Ministerial Round. As an extremely political subject matter, taxation
will place on WTO additional responsibilities and pressures, which
could impede its efforts towards achieving its goals. Additionally, the
FSC cases and the general exposure of income tax systems to WTO
scrutiny discussed in this article could serve as a good lesson for WTO
in its attempt to develop coherent jurisprudence - particularly in the
area of formalizing the aim and effect requirement for discrimination
finding. T
234 See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
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